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I. INTRODUCTION 
In 2016, Americans, like the rest of the world, remain concerned about 
terrorism and terrorist threats. In the wake of the Islamic State of Iraq and the 
Levant’s (ISIL) bombing of a Russian airline, its coordinated terrorist attacks in 
Paris,1 and the ISIL-inspired mass shooting in San Bernardino in December,2 
President Obama addressed the nation from the Oval Office about the U.S. 
government’s national security measures taken to keep this country safe from 
terrorism. He detailed the government’s strategy to destroy ISIL, which  involved 
the military tracking down terrorist plotters in any country, continuing to provide 
training and equipment to Iraqi and Syrian forces fighting ISIL, cutting off 
financing and curtailing the recruitment of fighters, and encouraging a ceasefire 
and political resolution to the Syrian War.3 Just as in 2004, national security is 
once again an important issue in the 2016 presidential debates.4 Yet noticeably 
 
1.  See Massimo Calabresi, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi: The Head of ISIS Exports Extreme Violence and 
Twisted Religion Around the Globe, TIME (Dec. 21, 2015), http://time.com/time-person-of-the-year-2015-
runner-up-abu-bakr-al-baghdadi/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (discussing the 
downing of a St. Petersburg-bound Metrojet over the Sinai peninsula and the November 13, 2015 Paris attacks 
organized by individuals with close ties to ISIS leadership); Michael Morell, What Comes Next, and How Do 
We Handle It?, TIME, Nov. 30, 2015, at 60 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (“The 
attacks in Paris were the first manifestation of an effort by ISIS to put together an attack capability in Europe”). 
2.   Calabresi, supra note 1.  
3.  President Barack Obama, Oval Office Address on Keeping the American People Safe (Dec. 6, 
2015), available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2015/12/05/president-obama-addresses-nation-keeping-
american -people-safe (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review); see also Michael R. Gordon & 
Helene Cooper, Mideast Allies Urged to Step Up ISIS Fight, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2015, at A12 (on file with 
The University of the Pacific Law Review) (reporting on Obama’s calling on Middle East allies to make military 
contributions in the fight against ISIS). 
4.  See, e.g., Richard Wolf & David Jackson, Terrorism is Top Debate Topic After Paris, California, 
USA TODAY, Dec. 16, 2015, at 2A (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (“Terrorism and 
national security took center stage in Las Vegas on Tuesday night with Donald Trump and a dozen other 
Republicans seeking their party’s nomination for president”); Patrick O’Connor & Janet Hook, Terror Tops the 
Agenda During Republican Debate, WALL ST. J., Dec. 16, 2015, at A1 (on file with The University of the 
Pacific Law Review) (“Republican presidential contenders clashed Tuesday over how to protect the country 
from a future terrorist attack . . . .); Reid J. Epstein & Rebecca Ballhaus, Long-Shots Emphasize Security, WALL 
ST. J., Dec. 16, 2015, at A4 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (“Four Republican long-
shot presidential candidates engaged in a detailed discussion Tuesday of how they would take on Islamic State 
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absent from these discussions is the thorny issue of how to close the Naval 
Detention Center on Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Without doubt, at the dawn of a 
new year, Guantanamo Bay will continue to be a political hot potato for the new 
president in 2017, as it was for Obama. 
Weeks before his presidential address, Obama decided to postpone plans to 
close the U.S. military prison at Guantanamo Bay,5 even though he has 
repeatedly expressed his desire to close the prison because it is 
“counterproductive to our offers to defeat terrorism around the world. 
Guantanamo is one of the première mechanisms for jihadists to recruit.”6 
Guantanamo remains a quagmire since congressional opposition and legal 
impediments have thwarted President Obama’s January 2009 pledge to close the 
U.S. detention center.7 Action should be taken since approximately one-half of 
the remaining 107 prisoners have been cleared for transfer to other countries 
willing to accept them by the U.S. government.8 Many prisoners have no 
 
militants and try to protect Americans in the wake of recent terror attacks in Paris and California.”); Laura 
Meckler, Clinton Lays Out Strategy On Terror, WALL ST. J., Dec. 16, 2015, at A4 (on file with The University 
of the Pacific Law Review) (“Former Secretary of State Hilary Clinton said Tuesday that protecting the nation 
from homegrown terrorism requires shutting down recruitment and training, while empowering Muslim 
Americans to be front-line allies in the fight against radicalization.”). 
5.  See Bryan Bender & Nahal Toosi, Obama Administration Delays Gitmo Closure Plan, POLITICO 
(Nov. 18, 2015), http://www.politico.com/story/2015/11/guantanamo-gitmo-cuba-216030 (on file with The 
University of the Pacific Law Review); see also JOAN BISKUPIC, BREAKING IN: THE RISE OF SONIA 
SOTOMAYOR AND THE POLITICS OF JUSTICE 156 (2014) (discussing Obama’s remarks about closing the U.S. 
naval prison on Guantanamo Bay during the presidential campaign, Obama’s January 22, 2009 executive order 
to close the prison, the obstacles the president faced in achieving that goal in the form of careful time-
consuming review of each individual case, and the reluctance of foreign countries to accept nationals who were 
linked to terrorism). 
6.  President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President at Veto Signing of National Defense 
Authorization Act (Oct. 22, 2015), available at www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/10/22/remarks-
president-veto-signing-national-defense-authorization-act (on file with The University of the Pacific Law 
Review); see also Matthew Ivey, A Framework for Closing Guantanamo Bay, 32 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 
353, 353 (2009) (suggesting “the global outcry for the closing of the military prison at Guantanamo Bay had 
been enormous”). 
7.  See Judith Resnik, Detention, the War on Terror, and the Federal Courts: An Essay in Honor of 
Henry Monaghan, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 579, 604 (2010) (“After President Obama came into office in January 
of 2009, he issued an Executive Order aimed at closing Guantanamo within a year. But, thereafter, a concerted 
effort by opponents depicted the detainees as too threatening to confine on the mainland”); see also Charlie 
Savage, Obama Team is Divided on Anti-Terror Tactics, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 28, 2010) 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/ 03/29/us/politics/29force.html?_r=0 (on file with The University of the Pacific 
Law Review) (“In March 2009, the Obama legal team adopted a new position about who was detainable in the 
war on terrorism-one that showed a greater deference to the international laws of war, including the Geneva 
Conventions, than Mr. Bush had”). 
8.  See Jack Healy, Prison Town Doesn’t Want Guantanamo Inmates, N.Y. TIMES, (Nov. 17, 2015) 
http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2015/11/17/us/coloradotownhometo11prisonsdoesntwantguantanamodetainees.html?_r=0 
(on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (describing the Colorado town being considered to 
house at least sixty-one Guantanamo inmates despite congressional efforts to prevent prisoner transfers onto 
American soil).  
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intelligence value, some are awaiting military trials, and the remainder wait in 
limbo, either because the government lacks sufficient evidence to prosecute or 
they are considered too dangerous for release.9 Even if the prisoners were 
released, aside from the actual threat to public safety, no town in America wants 
terrorists housed in its community because of the perceived dangerousness.10 In 
spite of these issues, many Republicans see Guantanamo as essential for 
detaining suspected foreign militants.11 Professor Gregory Maggs bluntly opines 
that in hindsight, the U.S. should not have these prisoners in its custody.12 
Looking forward, habeas corpus petitions for Guantanamo detainees are 
practically the only judicial remedy available for challenging their 
confinements.13 Generally, habeas corpus, guaranteed by the Constitution, is a 
means for prisoners to claim that they have been wrongfully convicted and 
unlawfully detained.14 Detainees can challenge their conviction by filing a 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court, and argue that their arrest, 
trial, or sentence violated federal law.15 The federal habeas petition provides for 
claims based on federal law.16 The reviewing court, which has the power to order 
the inmate’s immediate release, a new trial, or a new sentencing hearing, will 
review the petition to decide whether the conviction or sentence is illegal.17 
Specifically, as to the war on terrorism, the courts are tasked with reviewing 
the government’s incapacitation of terrorism suspects and striking an important 
balance between national security and civil liberties. Judge Forrest reminds us 
that, “striking the proper constitutional balance here is of great importance to the 
Nation during this period of ongoing combat . . . It is during our most challenging 
and uncertain moments that our Nation’s commitment to due process is most 
 
9.  Resnik, supra note 7, at 603–04.  
10.  See Healy, supra note 8 (discussing how a Colorado town had public image and targeted threat 
concerns when considered as a possible place to house remaining Guantanamo detainees). 
11.  See Patricia Zengerle & Doina Chiacu, Obama to Sign Defense Bill with Guantanamo Restrictions, 
REUTERS (Nov. 10, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/11/10us-usa-defense-congress-isUSKCNOSZ 
20151110#BditpgwXUXExPes9.97 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
12.  See Gregory E. Maggs, Responses to the Ten Questions, 35 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 5079, 5079 
(2009) (suggesting that the U.S. should have never taken prisoners in the war on terror, and noting the great 
financial costs for building and maintaining detention facilities and the protracted and endless litigation 
involved). 
13.  See Resnik, supra note 7, at 581 (“Thus far, habeas corpus has provided the principal jurisdictional 
predicate that has enabled individuals detained before judges who were not directly commissioned by the 
Department of Defense”). 
14.  28 U.S.C. §§ 2241–66 (2015); see also JONATHAN HAFERTZ, HABEAS CORPUS AFTER 9/11: 
CONFRONTING AMERICA’S NEW GLOBAL DETENTION SYSTEM 6 (2011) [hereinafter HAFERTZ, HABEAS] 
(describing habeas corpus as “a safeguard of individual liberty against illegal government action. Despite its 
limitations, habeas remains the single most important check against arbitrary and unlawful detention, torture, 
and other abuses”). 
15.  28 U.S.C. §§ 2241–66 (2015). 
16.   Id.  
17.  Id. 
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severely tested; and it is in those times that we must preserve our commitment at 
home to the principles for which we fight abroad.” 18 While federal cases proceed 
slowly, habeas petitions often move at a snail’s pace.19 As this article points out, 
for Guantanamo detainees, the idea of indefinite detention has become a harsh 
reality as the government has sought ways to avoid judicial oversight and to hold 
individuals without a criminal trial in federal courts.20 
Best understood in their proper historical, political, and sociological contexts, 
the litigation in internment cases, like the Guantanamo Bay litigation, illustrates 
how civil procedure can be used for political goals. These cases show that an 
individual habeas corpus petition is an inadequate remedy to challenge broad-
based indefinite detentions. A Japanese American subject to an exclusion order 
during World War II and a detainee in Guantanamo Bay today were, and are not, 
afforded the most basic procedural safeguards afforded to criminal defendants in 
federal court.21 Detainees can contest their detention using a writ of habeas 
corpus, which requires timely access to a hearing,22 but as discussed in this 
article, it may be an exercise in futility due to the length of time a detainee must 
wait for a judicial decision and the myriad of difficulties in persuading a court 
that they are entitled to relief. 
This article explores the relationship between the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
reasoning in Ex Parte Endo23 and the Guantanamo Bay habeas cases. In the 
process, it discusses four themes: (1) racial prejudice can consciously and 
unconsciously affect policy and lawmaking; (2) the Japanese-American 
internment experience during World War II and the Guantanamo Bay litigation 
during the war on terror showcase how executive power can be extended 
considerably during war time; (3) the executive branch can attempt to 
strategically skirt the Constitution by crafting national security policies to satisfy 
its agenda; and (4) courts can choose to stand strong against political and 
government pressure, or not. 
The first four sections of this article are descriptive. Part II explores the 
internment of Japanese Americans and specifically focuses on Endo, one of the 
lesser known internment cases that reached the Supreme Court in 1944 that 
 
18.  Hedges v. Obama, 809 F. Supp. 2d 424. 469 (S.D. N.Y. 2012). 
19.  See Caroline Wells Stanton, Rights and Remedies: Meaningful Habeas Corpus in Guantanamo, 23 
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 891, 898–900 (2010) (describing how courts interpret habeas for Guantanamo detainees 
in such a way to keep them detained longer, drawing out the petition process when compared to traditional 
habeas or federal jurisdiction cases).  
20.  See HAFERTZ, HABEAS, supra note 14, at 5–6.  
21.  KEVIN R. JOHNSON, OPENING THE FLOODGATES: WHY AMERICA NEEDS TO RETHINK ITS BORDERS 
AND IMMIGRATION LAWS 21 (2007) (drawing an analogy between the civil liberties of Japanese citizens and 
noncitizens during World War II and the harsh measures directed at noncitizens and U.S. citizens during the 
war on terror). 
22.   28 U.S.C. § 2243 (2015). 
23.  323 U.S. 283 (1944). 
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played a significant role in the Guantanamo cases the Court heard.24 Part One 
discusses the roles race, racism, and loyalty played after the bombing of Pearl 
Harbor on December 7, 1941, and how the military and Court minimized the 
mass civil liberties deprivation of 120,000 individuals of Japanese descent.25 Part 
III discusses the Bush Administration’s vast expansion of executive authority 
after September 11, 2001 and the Court’s analysis of five key Supreme Court 
Guantanamo Bay cases of the last decade.26 Part IV examines the D.C. Circuit’s 
current practice of denying habeas relief in all Guantanamo Bay cases on its 
docket.27 Part V analyzes the National Defense Authorization Act of 2012 and 
discusses the possibility of indefinitely detaining U.S. citizens in this country in 
the future.28 The article then takes a prescriptive turn in Part VI by offering 
pragmatic recommendations for reform.29 
II. THE INTERNMENT OF JAPANESE AMERICANS AND ENDO: IT WAS ABOUT RACE 
DESPITE THE GOVERNMENT AND SUPREME COURT INSISTENCE THAT IT WAS 
ABOUT “MILITARY NECESSITY” 
Under the shadows of the Japanese Navy’s bombing of Pearl Harbor on 
December 7, 1941, the War Relocation Authority (WRA) oversaw the removal, 
relocation, and supervision of persons pursuant to Executive Order No. 9066, 
which empowered the military to exclude person from designated areas.30 The 
government considered approximately 120,000 individuals of Japanese ancestry 
disloyal based on responses to dubious questionnaires. 31 They were uprooted 
and shipped off like cattle on trains to relocation centers and camps located in the 
 
24.   See infra Part I.  
25.   See infra Part I.  
26.   See infra Part II. 
27.   See infra Part III.  
28.   See infra Part IV. 
29.   See infra Part V. 
30.  See ERIC K. YAMAMOTO ET AL., RACE, RIGHTS AND REPARATION: LAW AND THE JAPANESE 
AMERICAN 99 (2d. ed. 2013); Amanda L. Tyler, The Forgotten Core Meaning of the Suspension Clause, 125 
HARV. L. REV. 901, 1001 (2012) (“With the outbreak of war, the military forcibly removed thousands of 
American citizens of Japanese descent from their homes and transported them to “relocation camps” for long-
term preventive detention.”); Sarah A. Whalin, National Security Versus Due Process: Korematsu Raises Its 
Ugly Head Sixty Years Later in Hamdi and Padilla, 22 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 711, 713 (2005); see also Eugene V. 
Rostow, The Japanese American Cases—A Disaster, 54 YALE L. J. 489, 502 (1954) (stating that the 
government “developed a system for the indefinite . . . detention of Japanese aliens and citizens of Japanese 
descent, without charges or trial, without term, and without visible promise of relief.”). 
31.  See Susan Kiyomi Serrano & Dale Minami, Korematsu v. United States: A "Constant Caution" in a 
Time of Crisis, 10 ASIAN L.J. 37, 37–38 (stating how the Court upheld the internment of 120,000 Japanese-
Americans based on a collection of “innocent facts, half-truths, and stereotypes” without any evidence of 
espionage or disloyalty).  
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deserts and swamplands of California, Idaho, Utah, Arizona, Wyoming, 
Colorado, and Arkansas.32 
Leaving behind their homes, businesses, and personal belongings, Japanese 
Americans were confined to spartan, prison-like internment camps.33 Internees 
were exposed to extreme seasonal temperature changes while living in communal 
facilities, dealing with poor health care, and a shortage of teachers, textbooks, 
and supplies for students.34 Held without any individual determination that they 
were a threat to national security, internees were fenced in by barbed wire and 
closely watched by the Army.35 Some internees were even shot and killed for 
alleged escape attempts.36 As an additional affront to their dignity, many 
internees were asked to complete loyalty questionnaires implying that they were 
loyal to Japan and disloyal to the U.S. These questionnaires asked internees if 
they would forswear their allegiance to the Emperor of Japan, and asked about 
their willingness to join the Auxiliary Corps and fight for the United States.37 
The treatment of the Japanese American internees was consistent with 
America’s historical animus against Asians. Social scientist Lisa Lowe suggests 
that Asians have been perceived as “immigrant” and “foreign-within” even when 
born in the United States with a familial lineage spanning multiple generations in 
America.38 Asians were not considered real Americans.39 Lowe asserts that 
Japanese Americans were “recognized as citizens . . . recruited into the U.S. 
military, yet were dispossessed of freedom and properties [and] condemned as 
‘racial enemies’” placed in internment camps.40 Simply put, other than their skin 
color, the Japanese and Japanese American internees were just like other 
 
32.  See YAMAMOTO ET AL., supra note 30, at 169; see also Erwin Chemerinsky, Detentions Without 
Due Process of Law Following September 11th, 20 TOURO L. REV. 809, 891 (2005); Whalin, supra note 30, at 
713; Donald Tamaki, Foreword: Sixty Years After the Internment: Civil Rights, Identity Politics, and Racial 
Profiling, 11 ASIAN AM. L.J. 147, 147 (2004); Serrano & Minami, supra note 31, at 37; Natsu Taylor Saito, 
Symbolism Under Siege: Japanese American Redress and the Racing of Arab Americans as Terrorists, 8 ASIAN 
AM. L.J. 1, 4 (2001); Eric K. Yamamoto, Korematsu Revisited - Correcting the Injustice of Extraordinary 
Government Excess and Lax Judicial Review: Time for a Better Accommodation of National Security Concerns 
and Civil Liberties, 26 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1, 1 (1986). 
33.  See YAMAMOTO ET AL., supra note 30, at 169; see also Rostow supra note 30, at 502 (finding “the 
camps were in fact concentration camps, where the humiliation of evacuation which ignored citizens’ rights, 
and the amenities which might have made the relocation palatable”). 
34.  See YAMAMOTO ET AL., supra note 30, at 173–74. 
35.  See id. at 175. 
36.  See id. 
37.  See Neil Gotanda, Race, Citizenship, and the Search for Political Community among “We the 
People,” A Review Essay on Citizenship without Consent, 76 OREGON L. REV. 233, 243 (1997). 
38.   LISA LOWE, IMMIGRANT ACTS: ON ASIAN AMERICAN CULTURAL POLITICS 5–6 (1996). 
39.  See id. at 5–8 (describing the historical influence of Asian immigrants on American society despite 
being categorized as “others,” as exemplified in the World War II internment of Japanese-Americans).  
40.  See id. at 8. 
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Americans, but to the government and the courts, they were presumptively 
disloyal.41 
It was politically prudent to support the internment. Even Earl Warren, then-
Governor of California, who later became known as a great guardian of civil 
rights and civil liberties.42 At a June 11, 1943 press conference in Sacramento, he 
insisted, “The evacuation of the Japanese saved our state from terrible disorders 
and sabotage.”43 Incredibly, by treating Japanese Americans as foreigners, the 
government and Court skirted any equal protection analysis. As one scholar 
suggests, “[t]he racialized identification of Japanese Americans as foreign—
regardless of their citizenship—allowed for otherwise unlawful actions to be 
taken against United States citizens.”44 
The internment was an egregious example of how laws may be used as an 
instrument of racism, and how racist laws may be defended by claims that they 
are not based on race.45 Today, the internment is considered one of the twentieth 
century’s most prominent mass trampling of civil liberties, and it has been widely 
condemned as racist governmental and judicial conduct toward the Japanese and 
Japanese Americans.46 There has been a longstanding denunciation by scholars 
and jurists about the Court’s internment case rulings, which paid great deference 
for the Government’s claims of military necessity and upheld the detention of 
Japanese Americans.47 Ninth Circuit Judge Wallace Tashima, who as a young 
 
41.  See Masumi Izumi, Alienable Citizenship: Race, Loyalty, and the Law in the Age of ‘American 
Concentration Camps,’ 1941–1971, 13 ASIAN AM. L.J. 1, 18 (2006) (“During World War II, the government 
failed to distinguish between the loyal and the disloyal among the Japanese American population.”). 
42.  See ED CRAY, CHIEF JUSTICE: A BIOGRAPHY OF EARL WARREN 157 (1997). Warren would later 
regret his advocacy of the removal order, which he conceded was brought “without evidence of disloyalty.” Id. 
at 159. 
43.   See id.  
44.  Natsu Taylor Saito, Model Minority, Yellow Peril: Functions of “Foreignness” in the Construction 
of Asian American Legal Identity, 4 ASIAN AM. L. J. 71, 76 (1997). 
45.  See Rostow supra note 30, at 496 (arguing that the evacuation of all persons of Japanese ancestry 
from the West Coast was not based on a military justification, but rather on “attitudes of racial” prejudice). 
46.   See e.g., YAMAMOTO ET AL., supra note 30, at 237 (“The government of the United States could not 
have interned the Japanese-Americans were it not for the tradition of anti-Asian prejudice in the country in 
general and on the West Coast in particular. Although historically the bias was predominantly anti-Chinese, 
there was no hesitation in deploying stereotypes of the shifty, untrustworthy Oriental onto both first-and second-
generation Americans of Japanese origin.”); Tyler, supra note 30, at 1002 (“The World War II detention of 
Japanese Americans on the West Coast stands entirely at odds with everything that the Founders thought they 
were accomplishing in adopting the Suspension Clause.”); Jerry Kang, Denying Prejudice: Internment, Redress, 
and Denial, 51 UCLA L. REV. 933, 1004 (2004) (“The Judiciary aided and abetted the internment of Japanese 
Americans . . . . It did so not only in terms of substance, by agreeing with racial profiling justification based on 
faint evidence, but also in terms of procedure—by delaying, framing, segmenting, did not deciding what was 
centrally at issue.”); NOAH FELDMAN, SCORPIONS: THE BATTLES AND TRIUMPHS OF FDR’S GREAT SUPREME 
COURT JUSTICES (2010). 
47.  See YAMAMOTO ET AL., supra note 30; see also Beverly E. Bashor, The Liberty/Safety Paradigm: 
The United States’ Struggle to Discourage Violations of Civil Liberties in Times of War, 41 W. ST. U. L. REV. 
617, 618 (2014) (characterizing the Japanese American internment as “one of the largest violations of civil 
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boy was an internee himself at Poston, Arizona, remarked, “[The internment] 
happened, at least in part, because the federal courts, which were supposed to be 
the bulwark protecting the Constitution from an overzealous [e]xecutive, failed in 
fulfilling their mandate under Article III of the Constitution.”48 
A. The Three Internment Cases Leading Up to Endo 
A brief review of the three other internment cases heard by the Court is 
necessary to illustrate the expansion of executive power through political 
maneuvering. The first two cases challenged military orders imposing a night 
curfew on Japanese Americans were decided quickly in 1943, during the middle 
of World War II, when victory for the allies was far from certain.49 In 
Hirabayashi v. United States,50 Gordon Hirabayashi was convicted for violating 
Public Proclamation No. 3,51 which imposed a curfew on all enemy aliens and 
citizens of Japanese descent.52 Hirabayashi was born and raised in Seattle, 
Washington, and had never been to Japan.53 Like all Japanese Americans, 
Hirabayashi was subject to General John L. DeWitt’s curfew order, requiring him 
to be at home each night from 8:00 p.m. until 6:00 a.m.54 Hirabayashi wanted to 
challenge the exclusion orders and turned himself in at F.B.I. headquarters. 55 He 
was convicted in a Seattle jury trial of two separate counts: intentionally violating 
the evacuation order and the curfew order.56 Disappointingly, when Hirabayashi 
reached the Court, it avoided the difficult issues of evacuation and internment, 
and instead simply upheld Hirabayashi’s conviction for violating the curfew. 57 
Next, in Yasui v. United States,58 Minoru Yasui was a U.S. citizen, educated 
as a lawyer, employed in a Japanese consular office, and actively involved in the 
 
liberties in the nation’s history”); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Explaining Korematsu: A Response to Dean 
Chemerinsky, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 173, 175 (2013) (“[T]he Court reacted the way it always has in a major war: by 
deferring to a strong and popular President who . . . had taken an action that he deemed militarily necessary, 
despite infringements of constitutional rights”); YAMAMOTO ET AL., supra note 30, at 141 (arguing that in 
Korematsu, “the Court deferred to the government’s unexamined assertion of military necessity and thereby 
sanction[s] the tragic and justified deprivation of personal liberty”). 
48.   A. Wallace Tashima, Play It Again, Uncle Sam, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 7, 9 (2005) [hereinafter 
Tashima Play It Again]. 
49.  See YAMAMOTO ET AL., supra note 30, at 126. 
50.  320 U.S. 81 (1943).  
51.  Public Proclamation No. 3, 7 Fed. Reg. 2543 (Apr. 2, 1942). 
52.  Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 88. 
53.  Id. at 84. 
54.   Id. at 83–84. 
55.  See YAMAMOTO ET AL., supra note 30, at 105. 
56.  Id. at 105, 107.  
57.   Id. at 298. 
58.  320 U.S. 115 (1943). 
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Japanese Americans Citizens League.59 He and his family were ordered to leave 
their home and report for internment.60 Intending to be a test case to challenge 
the evacuation orders, Yasui turned himself in at a police station. 61 He waived 
his right to a jury trial, and was found guilty after a bench trial. 62 Decided the 
same day as Hirabayashi, Yasui’s conviction was sustained for the same 
reasons.63 The Court again avoided the legality of the mass internment of an 
entire racial group by (mis)characterizing the case as a “curfew” case.64 
In 1943, War Relocation Authority officials, working with the War 
Department and the Office of Naval Intelligence, attempted to determine the 
loyalty of incarcerated men they hoped to recruit into military service.65 By late 
1944, Americans were confident about their domestic security and winning the 
war.66 That same year, the government passed the Renunciation Act of 1944, 
which enabled and encouraged Japanese Americans, who were desperate for their 
freedom, to renounce their American citizenship and move to Japan—far away 
from America’s shores.67 Having few options, many Japanese Americans only 
renounced their citizenship so that they could keep their families intact at Tule 
Lake and avoid the draft that would require them to fight for the same military 
that imprisoned them.68 Renouncing their citizenship was the equivalent of 
waiving their due process rights, including the right to counsel, notice of factual 
basis for charges, and a fair opportunity to rebut the government’s allegations 
before a fair natural decision-maker.69 After World War II, many internees who 
wanted their U.S. citizenship back argued that their renunciations were void due 
to duress and intimidation.70 Here, politics again played a role; when the 
renunciations increased, the Justice Department coldheartedly rejected them.71 
 
59.  See YAMAMOTO ET AL., supra note 30, at 126. 
60.  Id. at 127. 
61.  See id. at 128.  
62.  See id.  
63.  Yasui, 320 U.S. at 117. 
64.  See YAMAMOTO ET AL., supra note 30, at 155.  
65.  See Gotanda, supra note 37, at 243–44. 
66.  See YAMAMOTO ET AL., supra note 30, at 102 (explaining that the U.S. government had reason to 
believe country was at the risk of attack at the time the President signed the order, although that fear did not 
exist at the time the Court heard the case). If the U.S. and its allies were not winning in 1944, would the Court 
have still ruled the way it did in Endo? 
67.  See Gotanda, supra note 37, at 244.  
68.  See id. at 234 (describing how internees feared violence if they left the camps and believed that 
renouncing would allow them to stay in Tule Lake with their families and avoid the draft). 
69.  See id. at 244. 
70.   Id. at 245.  
71.  Id. at 233. 
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Soon after, a presidential proclamation followed designating denunciates as 
“enemy aliens” deportable under the Alien Act of 1798.72 
The politics of the internment machinery reached a pinnacle when the last of 
the camp rulings came down a day after the Roosevelt Administration announced 
the closure of the camps on Sunday, December 17, 1944.73 Justice Frankfurter, 
who maintained a line of communication with the Roosevelt Administration, 
likely tipped off the White House about the Court’s forthcoming decisions.74 
Some cynical scholars further suggest that the cases were also delayed and ruled 
upon on the same day—after the presidential election—so that any political 
backlash would be minimized.75 In Korematsu v. United States,76 the most well-
known of the cases, Fred Korematsu was apprehended by the San Leandro police 
while walking down the street.77 Korematsu waived his right to a jury trial, and 
was found guilty after a bench trial.78 Not surprisingly, the Court construed this 
matter as a “curfew” case and restricted its holding to the question of the 
evacuation alone, avoiding the issue of the internment’s constitutionality for the 
third time.79 Sounding almost like a broken record, the majority upheld the 
exclusion and denied that the case was about race.80 Together, the three cases 
underscore the Court’s reluctance to second-guess military judgment, and to give 
complete deference to detain Japanese Americans. 
B. Endo’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Justice Douglas’ Avoidance 
of the Constitutional Issues 
Endo, while not as famous as Korematsu, is a civil rights case just as 
politically significant.  Endo was the only internment case that did not challenge 
 
72.  Later, San Francisco civil rights attorney Wayne Collins was able to block large-scale deportations 
just prior to their scheduled departure. See id. at 244–45. 
73.   See id. at 243–44 (describing internees’ conflicted feelings on how to act followed the Supreme 
Court’s late December decision in Endo). 
74.  FELDMAN, supra note 46, at 964.   
75.  See YAMAMOTO ET AL., supra note 30, at 174. 
76.  323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
77.   YAMAMOTO ET AL., supra note 30 at 125.  
78.  See id, at 138–39.  
79.  See id. at 155; Eugene Gressman, Korematsu: A Mélange of Military Imperatives, 60 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROB. 15, 19 (2005) (finding that “[w]hen it comes to testing the constitutionality of the Korematsu 
exclusion order, Justice Black makes no effort to apply of the standards of review that the had set forth in the 
opening passages of his Korematsu opinion.”). 
80.   See Gotanda, supra note 37, at 231; see also YAMAMOTO ET AL., supra note 30 (“The U.S. Supreme 
Court’s differential approach, in Korematsu afforded almost completed autonomy to the military in its detention 
of Japanese Americans and signaled a hands off role in reviewing alleged government war power excesses, 
including those detrimental to the most fundamental of democratic liberties.”); Owen Fiss, Law is Everywhere, 
117 YALE L. J. 258, 277 (2008) (“Korematsu gave constitutional legitimacy to the mass relocation program, it 
nevertheless deferred to the government’s assessment of the need for such a policy and, furthermore, never 
considered whether less harmful alternatives were available.”). 
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a criminal conviction, but involved filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus81 
Endo, a twenty-two-year-old American citizen of Japanese ancestry, worked as a 
stenographer for the California Department of Motor Vehicles in Sacramento.82 
She had never been to Japan and did not speak or read Japanese.83 Endo’s brother 
served in the Army, and she was also the only female litigant in the internment 
litigation.84 
After Pearl Harbor, Endo was dismissed from her job and housed at the 
Tanforan Assembly Center, a converted racetrack near San Francisco surrounded 
by armed guard towers and the stench of horse manure.85 She was later removed 
to the Tule Lake War Relocation Center—temporary military-style camps in 
California near the Oregon border86—which housed inmates whose questionnaire 
answers suggested they were disloyal.87 
Although the War Relocation Authority considered Endo loyal and offered to 
release her on the condition that she would not return to California, Endo 
courageously refused the offer, and opted to pursue her request for judicial 
relief.88 With the assistance of James Purcell, a San Francisco Attorney, Endo 
filed a habeas corpus petition in the Northern District Court for the District of 
California. Endo requested release and argued that she was a loyal and law-
abiding American citizen being held unlawfully against her will because no 
formal charges were brought against her.89 Endo waited more than two years for 
adjudication.90 She filed her petition in district court in July 1942, but it was held 
in abeyance until Hirabayashi and Yasui were decided.91 Her petition was denied 
in July 1943, and the appeal was certified to the Ninth Circuit the following 
month.92 Afterwards, Endo was transferred to the Central Utah Relocation 
Center.93 
On October 12, 1944, oral argument was heard before the Supreme Court 
and a ruling was issued on December 18, 1944.94 But just like the other cases, the 
Endo Court avoided determining the constitutionality of internment by basing its 
 
81.   Fiss, supra note 80, at 285. 
82.  Feldman, supra note 46, at 236.   
83.  YAMAMOTO ET AL., supra note 30, at 167.  
84.  Id. 
85.  Id. 
86.  Id. 
87.  See Gotanda, supra note 37, at 233.   
88.  STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK: A JUDGE’S VIEW 185 (2010). 
89.  See YAMAMOTO ET AL., supra note 30, at 173.  
90.   Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. at 285. 
91.   YAMAMOTO ET AL., supra note 30, at 156.  
92.   Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. at 285. 
93.  Id. at 284–85. 
94.   Id. at 283.  
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ruling on administrative law grounds to shield the Executive Branch from 
accountability.95 
Justice Douglas, a Roosevelt loyalist who maintained presidential aspirations 
and who was well aware of the political implications of the case, wrote the 
unanimous opinion.96 As a practical matter, the internees would eventually be 
released, despite strong West Coast political support for the internment 
program.97 Seemingly wearing color-blind goggles, Douglas viewed exclusion as 
an issue of loyalty, not race.98 With the release of Japanese American internees, 
he thought justice would be served, and integrity of the Roosevelt 
Administration’s detention policy would be maintained.99 
Within the administrative law framework, two-thirds of the opinion was 
devoted to the origins of relevant executive orders and legislative acts.100 At the 
outset, Executive Order 9066 delegated power to the military to bar access to 
military areas.101 The opinion then explained that the Military Commander of the 
 
95.  See, e.g., Jennifer K. Elsea, Citizens as Enemy Combatants, CONG. RES. SERV. REP. FOR CONG., Feb. 
24, 2005, at 23 (“The Court avoided the question of whether internment of citizens would be constitutionally 
permissible where loyalty were at issue or where Congress explicitly authorized it, but the Court’s use of them 
‘concededly loyal’ to limit the scope of the finding may be read to suggest that there is a Fifth Amendment 
guarantee of due process applicable to determination of loyalty or dangerousness.”); Izumi, supra note 41, at 18 
(“By shifting the discourse from race to loyalty, the Supreme Court avoided rendering an opinion on the 
constitutionality of internment . . . by discussing loyalty in assessing the constitutionality of citizens’ detention, 
the Court brought the matter of loyalty into the analysis of the reasonableness of restrictions on civil liberties.”); 
Jerry Kang, Watching the Watchers: Enemy Combatants in the Internment’s Shadow, 68 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 
260, 271 (2005) (“There was no holding that the executive and legislative branches of government had deprived 
Mitsuye Endo, an American citizen, of her constitutional rights; rather, the Court decided the case on 
administrative law grounds.”). Aya Gruber, Raising the Red Flag: The Continued Relevance of the Japanese 
Internment in the Post-Hamdi World, 54 KANSAS L. REV. 307 (2006) (“The Court ultimately resolved Endo’s 
claims through legislative interpretation rather than constitutional analysis.”).But see Patrick O. Gudridge, 
Remember ENDO? 116 HARV. L. REV. 1933, 1939 (2003) (analyzing the constitutional references in the 
opinion and concluding that Endo was a constitutional law case just like Korematsu).  
96.  See Feldman, supra note 46 at 241. During that Supreme Court term Lucile Lomen served as the 
first female Supreme Court law clerk. She started clerking for Douglas in September 1944 amidst a great deal of 
press coverage. See Jennie Berry Chandra, Lucile Lomen: The First Female United States Supreme Court Law 
Clerk, in CHAMBERS: STORIES OF SUPREME COURT LAW CLERKS AND THEIR JUSTICES 206 (Todd C. Peppers & 
Artemus Ward eds., 2012). While Lomen clerked, the role of Supreme Court law clerks expanded, and clerks 
made substantive contributions in decisions. Lomen did just this in Ex Parte Endo. Id. at 207–08. The ruling 
was perhaps influenced by Lomen’s memoranda, which briefed Justice Douglas on the duty of the Court to 
construe a statute, if possible, so as to avoid a conclusion that is unconstitutional, including incarcerating an 
entire race of people. Id. at 207. At the end of the term, Douglas had such a good experience with Lomen as his 
clerk that he was more responsive to hiring a female clerk in later years. Id. at 209–10. After leaving her 
clerkship, Lomen went on to serve in the Washington State Attorney General’s Office and to represent General 
Electric in a number of legal positions. Id. at 210–15. 
97.  Feldman, supra note 46 at 247.  
98.  Id. 
99.   Id. at 246-47. 
100.  Ex Parte Endo, 323 U.S. at 284. 
101.  EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRES., EXECUTIVE ORDER 9066: AUTHORIZING THE SECRETARY OF WAR TO 
PRESCRIBE MILITARY AREAS, 7 Fed. Reg. 1407 (Feb. 19, 1942). 
2016 / Habeas Corpus, Civil Liberties, and Indefinite Detention During Wartime 
804 
Western Defense Command was to carry out duties, and it was DeWitt who 
issued Civilian Exclusion Orders, the WRA, and Civil Restrictive Orders.102 
Douglas determined that the President and Congress did not authorize detention 
because neither Order 9066, Executive Order 9012, which created the WRA, nor 
Public Law 503, which created criminal penalties for violating military 
regulations, made any mention of detention.103 Therefore, he concluded that the 
WRA was never authorized to detain Endo.104 
With regard to the Court’s framing of these issues, Professor Jerry Kang 
argues that “[i]n Endo, the Supreme Court manipulated the question of executive 
and congressional authorization to deny accountability. By finding that the full-
blown internment had never been authorized by the President and Congress, the 
suffering of Japanese Americans was never attributed to the actors in fact 
responsible.”105  Kang adds, “Douglas provides political cover to Congress and 
President Roosevelt by explaining that no assumption should be made that 
Congress and the President intended that the discriminatory action should be 
taken against these people wholly on account of their ancestry even though the 
government conceded their loyalty to this country.”106 
The thrust of the opinion is found in Douglas’ lengthy discussion of loyalty. 
The U.S. government could not continue to detain Endo, a citizen who was 
“concededly loyal” to the United States: 
It is conceded by the Department of Justice and by the War Relocation 
Authority that appellant is a loyal and law-abiding citizen. They make no 
claim that she is detained on any charge or that she is even suspected of 
disloyalty. Moreover, they do not contend that she may be held any 
longer in the Relocation Center.107 They concede that it is beyond the 
power of the War Relocation Authority to detain citizens against whom 
no charges of disloyalty or subversiveness have been made for a period 
longer than that necessary to separate the loyal from the disloyal and to 
provide the necessary guidance for relocation.108 
Nevertheless, Douglas insisted that evacuation was justified because it was 
an “espionage and sabotage measure,” while downplaying any discriminatory 
 
102. Ex Parte Endo, 323 U.S. at 288–291. 
103. Id. at 297. 
104. See YAMAMOTO ET AL., supra note 30, at 174.  
105. See Kang, supra note 96, at 268.  
106. Id. at 304. 
107. Id. at 294–95. 
108. Id. at 295. 
The University of the Pacific Law Review / Vol. 47 
805 
intent behind the evacuation.109 Here, Douglas announced the constitutional basis 
for challenging the detention: 
We are of the view that Mitsuye Endo should be given her liberty. In 
reaching that conclusion we do not come to the underlying constitutional 
issues which have been argued. . . . the Fifth Amendment provides that 
no person shall be deprived of liberty (as well as life or property) without 
due process of law. Moreover, as a further safeguard against invasion of 
the basic civil rights of the individual it is provided in Art. 1, § 9 of the 
Constitution that ‘The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not 
be suspected, unless when it Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public 
Safety may require it.’110 
The Justice then declined to apply it: 
We mention these constitutional provisions not to stir the constitutional 
issues which have been argued at the bar but to indicate the approach 
which we think should be made to an Act of Congress or an order of the 
Chief Executive that touches the sensitive area of rights specifically 
guaranteed by the Constitution.111 
Douglas’ avoidance of the constitutional issue was strongly criticized in 
separate concurrences by Murphy and Roberts.112 The divergent opinions were 
reflective of the debates in conference. First, Justice Murphy insisted that Endo’s 
detention and internment were based on race, and “racial discrimination . . . bears 
no reasonable relation to military necessity and is utterly foreign to the ideals and 
tradition of the American people.”113 Second, Justice Roberts criticized the 
majority’s avoidance of the underlying constitutional issues: “The opinion . . . 
attempts to show that neither the executive nor the legislative arm of the 
Government authorized the detention.”114 In his view, the issues were much more 
important and Endo posed “a serious constitutional question—whether the 
relator’s detention violated the guarantees of the Bill of Rights of the federal 
Constitution and especially the guarantee of due process of law.”115 
Further, in an issue that would be pivotal sixty years later in the Guantanamo 
Bay litigation, Douglas addressed the jurisdictional issue of whether the district 
court had justification to grant the writ of habeas corpus for Endo’s relocation 
 
109. Ex Parte Endo, 323 U.S. at 302–04. 
110.  Id. at, 297–99. 
111. Id. at 299. 
112.  Id. at 308. 
113. Id. at 307–08. 
114. Id. at 308. 
115. Id. at 310. 
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from Tule Lake to Utah.116 Endo’s relocation did not destroy jurisdiction because 
there was not a proper respondent in the Northern District of California due to the 
fact that no one in that district was responsible for Endo’s detention.117 
According to Douglas, jurisdiction existed because the Secretary of the Interior 
or any WRA official could oblige the court’s issuance of a writ.118 Douglas 
acknowledged that Endo was never served with process, nor did she appear in the 
proceedings.119 In the end, Endo’s victory rang hollow. Even if Endo lost at the 
high court, she would have eventually been released following the War 
Department’s announcement of the forthwith release of internees.120 
C. Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians and Coram 
Nobis Litigation: Vindication at Last 
Korematsu, Hirabayashi, and Yasui would eventually find judicial 
redemption. Almost forty years after Endo, Congress established the Commission 
on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians121 to review the facts and 
circumstances surrounding Executive Order 9066.122 The Commission examined 
the effects of the order on American citizens and permanent residents, and 
reviewed U.S. military directives requiring the relocation and detention of 
Japanese Americans.  Its findings and conclusions were unanimous: “the record 
does not permit the conclusion that the military necessity warranted the exclusion 
of ethnic Japanese from the West Coast.”123 
The coram nobis litigation arose in the mid-1980s, when litigants reopened 
the internment cases and revealed that during World War II, the Departments of 
Justice and War suppressed and altered exculpatory evidence showing that 
military evacuation and internment was unnecessary.124 The truth was that the 
 
116. Id. at 305. 
117. Id. at 305. 
118. Id. at 305. 
119. Id. at 285. 
120. See CRAY, supra note 42, at 159.  
121. See PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED: REPORT OF THE COMMISSION OF WARTIME RELOCATION AND 
INTERNMENT OF CIVILIANS 1 (1982) (a federal agency Congress created in 1980 to investigate the Japanese 
Americans internment and explore potential redress).  
122. EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRES., EXECUTIVE ORDER 9066: AUTHORIZING THE SECRETARY OF WAR TO 
PRESCRIBE MILITARY AREAS, 7 Fed. Reg. 1407 (Feb. 19, 1942). 
123. See PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 121, at 8 (1982); see also Rostow, supra note 30, at 496 
(“There was no sabotage on the part of persons of Japanese ancestry, either in Hawaii or on the West Coast.”). 
124. YAMAMOTO ET AL., supra note 30, at 294–309; Saito, supra note 32, at 6; see also Erwin 
Chemerinsky, Post 9/11 Civil Rights: Are Americans Sacrificing Freedom for Security?, 81 DENVER U. L. REV. 
759, 760 (2004) (“Not one Japanese-American was ever accused, indicted or convicted of espionage or any 
crime implicating national security”). Serrano & Minami, supra note 31, at 42–45; Saito, supra note 32 at 73–
74 (“The coram nobis petitions were based on the 1981 discovery of evidence that the War Department had 
knowingly concealed information about the danger (or lack thereof) posed by Japanese Americans”). 
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government withheld information from internal investigative reports, misled the 
Court, and the internment was motivated by racial bias.125 
Korematsu, Hirabayashi, and Yasui, through coram nobis petitions, 
successfully sought to vacate their wartime convictions on grounds of 
government prosecutorial misconduct and lack of military necessity.126 The three 
men were later awarded the Presidential Medal of Freedom.127 Since Endo was 
the only “successful” internment case, there was no need for Endo to file a coram 
nobis petition. Showing that many still remember Endo’s courageous act, there 
has been a push for her to receive a Presidential Medal of Freedom posthumously 
as well.128 
III. NATIONAL SECURITY IS THE NEW MILITARY NECESSITY: THE BUSH 
ADMINISTRATION AND THE SUPREME COURT GUANTANAMO BAY CASES 
The actions of the government in holding enemy combatants without 
meaningful judicial review strike at the heart of the rule of law. The government 
has claimed that its actions, no matter how egregious or how violative of the law, 
cannot be reviewed in any court.129 
A. September 11, 2001 and the Influence of Race, Culture, and Religion on 
Policy and Law-Making 
A week after terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon killed 
nearly three thousand people, Congress passed the 2001 Authorization of Use of 
Military Force (AUMF).130  The AUMF authorized the President to “use all 
necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons 
he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks” or 
 
125. See YAMAMOTO ET AL., supra note 30, at 285; Whalin, supra note 30, at 719.  
126. See YAMAMOTO ET AL., supra note 30, at 280–81.   
127. Most recently, Minoru Yasui posthumously received the Presidential Medal of Freedom on 
November 16, 2015. See White House: Office of the Press Secretary, President Obama Names Recipients of the 
Presidential Medal of Freedom (Nov. 16, 2015) https//www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/11/16/ 
president-obama-names-recipients-presidential-medal-freedom (on file with The University of the Pacific Law 
Review). 
128. See Frances Kai-Hwa Wang, Supporters for Misuye Endo’s Presidential Medal of Freedom (July 14, 
2015), http://www.nbc.com/news/asian-america/supporters-recommend-presidential-medal-freedom-mitsuye-en 
do-n391736  (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (“California State Senate and U.S. 
Representatives Dori Matsui, Mike Honda, Mark Takai, and Mark Takano have joined the growing list of 
supporters for Mitsuye Endo (1920–2006) to be posthumously awarded the Presidential Medal of Freedom, the 
nation’s highest civilian honor, for challenging the incarceration of Japanese Americans during World War 
II.”). 
129. Erwin Chemerinsky, Enemy Combatants and Separation of Powers, J. OF NAT’L SEC. L. & POLICY 
73, 87 (2005). 
130. See Authorization for Use of Military Force, 50 U.S.C. §1541(a) (2001). 
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“harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of 
intentional terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or 
persons.”131 Unlike the Japanese Empire during World War II, the new enemy 
did not represent a government, did not wear uniforms, and targeted civilians.132 
Congress also passed the USA Patriot Act,133 authorizing the federal 
government to issue warrantless searches and seizures, intercept electronic 
communications, including wiretaps,134 and expand the grounds upon which 
noncitizens could be removed from the country.135 Emboldened with this 
authority, the U.S. government implemented special registration of Arab and 
Muslim noncitizens, indefinitely held “enemy combatants,” and engaged in 
selective deportation campaigns based on national origin.136 
Next, the government enacted immigration laws, not to remove unlawful or 
undocumented immigration, but to detain suspected terrorists.137 Immigration 
policy and criminal laws allowed for lengthy detention and delay of deportations 
spanning months, if not years.138 These individuals were prosecuted on the basis 
of citizenship statutes rather than criminal charges and were not afforded 
constitutional protections traditionally afforded to defendants, such as requiring 
 
131. Authorization for the Use of Military, 50 U.S.C. §1541 (2001) [hereinafter AUMF]. 
132. See Sarah Lohmann & Chad Austin, When the War Doesn’t End, Detainees in Legal Limbo, 92 
DENV. U.L. REV. ONLINE 1, 7 (2014). 
133. USA Patriot Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1531 (2001).  
134. See ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR 115 
(2007).  
135. JOHNSON, supra note 21; Jennifer M. Chacon, The Security Myth: Punishing Immigration in the 
Name of National Security Power, in GOVERNING IMMIGRATION THROUGH CRIME: A READER 77 (Julie A. 
Dowling & Jonathan Xavier Inda eds., 2013) (“Since September 11 . . . the rationale of ‘national security’ has 
provided the primary justification for more vigorous immigration law enforcement”). 
136. Chacon, supra note 135. (“Immigration law has been ground zero of the U.S. government’s so-called 
war on terror”); see also Gotanda, supra note 37, at 663 (“[T]here was widespread use of ethnic profiling aimed 
at individuals who ‘look Arab’ immediately after 9-11. Such profiling is based upon a presumption that 
someone who ‘looks Arab’ is potentially disloyal.”). 
137. JOHNSON, supra note 21, at 49 (discussing the targeting of Muslims and Arabs for arrest, detention, 
and interrogation and arguing “[t]he antiterrorism policies have affected the civil rights of Muslim and Arab 
immigrants in the U.S.”). The government’s authority relied on to adopt harsh measures in the war on terror to 
deport noncitizens can be traced to the Plenary Power Doctrine. See, e.g., Chacon,, supra note 135, at 80 (“[the] 
Plenary Power included the authority to deport noncitizens physically present in the United States . . . The 
rationale is that immigration is inextricably tied up with foreign policy.”); Victor C. Romero, On Elian and 
Aliens: A Political Solution to the Plenary Power Problem, 4 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 343, 348–55 
(2001); Natsu Taylor Saito, The Enduring Effect of the Chinese Exclusion Cases: The Plenary Power 
Justification for Ongoing Abuses of Human Rights, 10 ASIAN AM. L.J. 13, 14 (2013) (discussing the origins of 
the plenary power doctrine in United States jurisprudence and observing that “the plenary power doctrine was 
first articulated in the immigration context in the Chinese exclusion cases’). 
138. See Juliet P. Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power, in 
GOVERNING IMMIGRATION THROUGH CRIME: A READER 63 (Julie A. Dowling & Jonathan Xavier Inda eds., 
2013). 
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the government to prove a defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.139 In 
deferential immigration proceedings concerning suspected terrorism, only the 
Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause is applicable.140 All told, U.S. law 
enforcement arrested and interviewed thousands of citizens and the Immigration 
and Naturalization Service detained 738 individuals indefinitely until they were 
cleared.141 
Legal experts on internment suspect that after September 11, 2001, the 
legislative branch aligned with the executive branch in a collaborative effort to 
sacrifice fundamental liberties for national security, in a manner similar to the 
process that led to Japanese American internment.142 Both Japanese Americans 
and Muslims were marked by the presumption of racial guilt. During the 
Japanese American internment, the government advanced a racist lie that persons 
of Japanese descent in America were traitors because of their race.143 Whereas, 
after the September 11th attacks the government engaged in racial scape-
goating.144 This was evident in the federal government’s racial and cultural 
profiling of Arab and Muslim-Americans.145 
 
139. See id.; Chacon, supra note 135, at 77 (arguing that post-September 11, 2001 “suspects,” were 
“detained on immigration-related charges lower standards of proof then that which would have been required 
for criminal investigation . . . .many were removed . . . .without public hearings”). 
140. See Chacon, supra note 135, at 65.  
141. See id. at 88.   
142. See YAMAMOTO ET AL., supra note 30, at 406; see also Serrano & Minami, supra note 31, at 38 
(“Korematsu and the national security and civil liberties tension that it embodies have reemerged in the wake of 
September 11, 2001 . . . .terrorist attacks.”). 
143.  Ex Parte Endo, 323 U.S. at 304. 
144. See YAMAMOTO ET AL., supra note 30, at 408.; Liette Gilbert, Immigration and Local Politics: Re-
Borders Immigration Through Deterrence and Incapacitation, in GOVERNING IMMIGRATION THROUGH CRIME: 
A READER 185 (Julie A. Dowling & Jonathan Xavier Inda eds., 2013) (“The Department of Homeland 
Security’s discretionary power of detention on national grounds of security has been particularly controversial 
given the conflation of immigrants and terrorists, and the racial and religious profiling of communities.”); 
JOHNSON, supra note 21, at 2 (asserting “Measures taken by the federal government against Arab and Muslim 
noncitizens after September 11, 2001, to arrest, detain and remove them, based on tenuous connections to 
terrorism); Saito, supra note 137 (“the immigration-related justifications for the post-September 11 surveillance, 
questioning, and detention of noncitizens seems to be pretextual”); Saito, supra note 32, at 15 (“In this new war, 
Arab Americans and Muslims have quickly become the most visible ‘enemy’”). 
145. See e.g., Eric L. Miller, 12/7 and 9/11: War, Liberties, and the Lessons of History, 104 W. VA. L. 
REV. 571, 573 (2002); David Cole, The Priority of Morality: The Emergency Constitution’s Blindspot, 113 
YALE L. J. 1753, 1787 (2004) (“The Justice Department’s targeting of Arabs and Muslims in the wake of 
September 11 has identified few terrorists, but it has alienated large segments of the Arab and Muslim 
communities, both here and abroad . . . suspicionless preventive detention has no more than a random change of 
furthering security, and poses a significant likelihood of actually undermining security.”); Eric L. Muller, 
Inference or Impact? Racial Profiling and the Internment’s True Legacy, 1 OHIO STATE J. OF CRIM. L. 103, 123 
(2003) (“In the weeks after September 11, 2001, law enforcement agents arrested hundreds of mostly Arab and 
Muslim aliens and hold them, often for long periods and in oppressive conditions, on immigration charges that 
would not have been brought before the September 11 attacks of on criminal charges unrelated to terrorism.”); 
see also Kirk Semple, Muslim Youths in U.S. Feel Strain of Suspicion, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2015, at A1 
(discussing anti-Muslim animus and suspicion of Muslim youth in the United States following recent terrorist 
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On this issue, Professor Lisa Marie Cacho argues that Muslims were racially 
profiled and portrayed as threats, which “subjected [them] to lawlessness and 
unregulated state violence.”146 As an aside, she argues that this particular social 
construction was enabled by President Bush’s post-9/11 speeches equating the 
war against “evil-doers” with war against “terrorists.”147 In effect, these speeches 
invoked a racialized image of terrorists and their national origins and religious 
connotations.148 As a result, approximately five hundred people were detained by 
the Justice Department and held on suspicion of immigration law violations and 
criminal charges unrelated to terrorism, and some were held as “material 
witnesses.”149 The Justice Department invited more than five thousand young 
aliens of mostly Arab and Muslim countries to voluntary interview under the 
auspices of information-gathering purposes about al Qaeda and other foreign-
based terrorist organizations.150 
B. The War on Terrorism: An Unprecedented Expansion of Executive Power 
Within the government-manufactured framework of the “war on terrorism” 
an unprecedented expansion of executive power began.151 On November 13, 
2001, President Bush issued a military order directing the Secretary of Defense to 
 
attacks in Paris and San Bernardino). Interesting, the attitudes of Americans about racial profiling changed after 
September 11, 2001. Americans seemingly were more accepting of racial profiling as it relates to national 
security.  
146. Lisa Marie Cacho, SOCIAL DEATH: RACIALIZED RIGHTLESSNESS AND THE CRIMINALIZATION OF THE 
UNPROTECTED 22 (2012). 
147. See id. at 97. 
148. Id. at 103; see also David Manuel Hernandez, Pursuant to Deportation: Latinos and Immigrant 
Detention, in GOVERNING IMMIGRATION THROUGH CRIME: A READER 201 (Julie A. Dowling & Jonathan 
Xavier Inda eds., 2013) (“The post 9/11 ‘war on terror’ contributed to the ongoing history of racial 
discrimination against noncitizens, initiating a variety of legal and administrative changes directly affecting 
U.S. immigration policy.”). 
149. See Miller, supra note 145, at 573; see also YAMAMOTO ET AL., supra note 30, at 395 (“Since the 
9/11 attacks, the federal government has detained dozens of individuals under the pretext of using them as 
material witnesses. . . . Although they are only permitted to be held for the time required to testify or be 
deposed, the government has repeatedly held individuals as material witnesses, at times for longer than six 
months, without deposing them or calling them to testify.”); Kevin R. Johnson & Bernard Trujillo, Immigration 
Reform, National Security After September 11, and the Future of North American Integration, 91 MINN. L. REV. 
1369, 1377 (2007) (“After September 11, 2001, the U.S. government took a variety of immigration-related 
measures in the name of national security because non citizens were involved in the terrorist attacks.”); SHARON 
L. DAVIES, PROFILING TERROR IN THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: SEARCHES AND SEIZURES 184 (2011). 
150. Miller, supra note 145, at 574; see also DAVIS, supra note 134, at 117; YAMAMOTO ET AL., supra 
note 30, at 395.  
151. See YAMAMOTO ET AL., supra note 30, at 391; Tashima Play It Again, supra note 48 (“Since the 
Attack on the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001, we had an administration and an attorney general 
determined to expand the constitutional limits of the President’s war-making powers, no against a foreign 
enemy, but here at home against our own citizens and residents.”). 
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create military tribunals and establish detention authority.152 He also convinced 
Congress that denial of habeas corpus rights to alleged Guantanamo enemy 
combatants was necessary.153 The American naval base on Guantanamo Bay 
began housing detainees indefinitely in the weeks after September 11, 2001. 
Choosing the detention centers on Guantanamo Bay and Bagram Air Base in 
Afghanistan was a legal strategy to prevent federal courts from establishing and 
reviewing jurisdiction.154 As a mantra, the White House argued that the military 
could indefinitely detain individuals arrested on U.S. soil without charge and due 
process.155 The prison would eventually house 775 detainees.156 Obviously, there 
were dangerous and violent men detained, but the overwhelming majority of 
Guantanamo detainees—all foreign citizens—have not been convicted of any 
criminal offense. However, they are still indefinitely detained as illegal enemy 
combatants.157 In 2008, Judge Tashima wrote that most of the Guantanamo 
detainees captured since 2002 “have languished in Guantanamo without hearings 
to determine their status.”158 An especially extreme example is Abu Baydah, who 
 
152. See Neal K. Katyal & Laurence H. Tribe, Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying the Military 
Tribunals, 111 YALE L. J. 1259, 1259–60 (2002). 
153. Id. 
154. See e.g., JOAN BISKUPIC, AMERICAN ORIGINAL: THE LIFE AND CONSTITUTION OF SUPREME COURT 
JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA 328 (2009) (“The administration had chosen Guantanamo as a site for terrorism-
related prisoners in large measure because it assumed it would be considered outside the jurisdiction of federal 
courts.”); Jonathan Hafertz, Military Detention in the “War on Terrorism”: Normalizing the Exceptional After 
9/11, 112 COLUMBIA L. REV. SIDEBAR, 31, 32 (2012) [hereinafter Hafertz, Military]; Gerald L. Neuman, The 
Extraterritorial Constitution After Boumediene v. Bush, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 259, 260 (2009); Ralph Wilde, 
Legal “Blackhole”? Extraterritorial State Action and International Treaty Law on Civil and Political Rights, 
26 MICH. J. INT’L L. J 739 (2005). 
155. See e.g., JOAN BISKUPIC, SANDRA DAY O’CONNOR: HOW THE FIRST WOMAN ON THE SUPREME 
COURT BECAME ITS MOST INFLUENTIAL JUSTICE 332 (2005) (“The Bush administration claimed that the 
president had sweeping power to imprison indefinitely anyone picked up in the war zone in connection with 
those or other military activities and to designate those individuals ‘enemy combatants’.”); A. Wallace Tashima, 
The War of Terror and the Rule of Law, 15 ASIAN AM. L. J. 245, 246 (2008) [hereinafter Tashima War] (“Since 
September 11, 2001, the Administration has been detaining suspected terrorists without criminal charges and 
without designation as prisoners of war, opting instead to label these suspects as ‘enemy combatants’ or 
‘unlawful combatants’.”); Neal Devins, Congress, The Supreme Court, and Enemy Combatants: How 
Lawmakers Buoyed Judicial Supremacy by Placing Limits, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1582 (2007) (“Throughout its 
prosecution of the war on terror, the Bush Administration has sought to limit, if not nullify, judicial checks on 
the executive.”); Jesselyn A. Ralack, United States Citizen Detained as “Enemy Combatants”: The Right to 
Counsel as a Matter of Ethics, 12 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 221, 241 (2003) (“If American citizens can be 
locked away without any sort of counsel or meaningful review for as long as the United States remains at war 
with al Qaeda, the liberty of all Americans effectively become the hostage of Presidential whim.”); 
Chemerinsky, supra note 124, at 761 (arguing the White House and Justice Department embraced the 
proposition that executive authority allows for the suspension of the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments). 
Chemerinsky asserted that with regard to the indefinite detention of enemy combatants, “President Bush has 
said they can be held until the end of the war on terrorism, which can go beyond any of our lives.” Id. at 763. 
156. See YAMAMOTO ET AL., supra note 30, at 402. 
157. See Fiss, supra note 80, at 265.  
158. Tashima War, supra note 155, at 262. 
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was seized during a raid in Pakistan in 2002, taken to secret sites, and subjected 
to “enhanced interrogation” involving physical punishment and sleep 
deprivation.159 He remains in custody today.160 
C. Circumventing the Constitution in the Name of National Security 
From the start, the Bush Administration construed terrorism as an armed 
conflict rather than criminal activity to circumvent any access to meaningful due 
process of law.161 The Bush Administration intended to have detainees tried in 
military commissions, where there is a significantly lower evidentiary burden for 
the government’s prosecutors to satisfy.162 Additionally, unlike in civilian courts, 
hearsay evidence and statements made in secret interrogations are admissible.163 
The government attempted to shield the President’s administration from 
accountability by withholding substantive judicial review.164 As discussed below, 
unlike the internment cases where the Court turned a blind eye towards the racial 
reality of camps, the Court in five Guantanamo Bay cases rejected the President’s 
claim that he could detain prisoners without legal protections or hold them 
indefinitely without judicial review simply by imprisoning them outside the 
United States.165 Instead, the Court indicated the importance of habeas by 
upholding the right of Guantanamo detainees to have access to federal courts and 
honoring the fidelity of the Constitution.  
 
159. See Raymond Bonner, Incommunicado’ Forever: Gitmo Detainee’s Case Stalled for 2,477 Days and 
Counting, PROPUBLICA (May 12, 2015), http://www.propublica.org/article/guantanammo-detainee-case-stalled-
for-2477-days-and -counting (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
160.  Id.  
161. See HAFERTZ, HABEAS, supra note 14, at 3 (“In the years after the 9/11 attacks, Mr. Bush claimed 
virtually unlimited power as commander in chief to detain those he deemed a threat”). 
162. Hafertz, Military, supra note 154, at 40.  
163. Id.; see also Jonathan Hafertz, Reconceptualizing Federal Courts in the War on Terror, 56 ST. 
LOUIS L. J. 1055, 1094 (2012) [hereinafter Hafertz, Reconceptualizing] (“The D.C. Circuit has also upheld the 
use of hearsay evidence and rejected efforts by detainees to invoke rights under the Constitution’s 
Confrontation Clause”). 
164. See YAMAMOTO ET AL., supra note 30; Hafertz, Military, supra note 154, at 32.   
165. See David Cole, Against Citizenship as a Predicate for Basic Rights, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2541, 
2547 (2007) (reporting that the Court rejected the Bush Administration’s “claim of unfettered executive power” 
in Rasul and Hamdi); HAFERTZ, HABEAS, supra note 14, at 2. 
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D. Judicial Review of Petitions for Writ of Habeas Corpus Filed by 
Guantanamo Detainees 
1. 2004: The Supreme Court Addresses the Issues Posed by Guantanamo 
Bay Detainees Rasul, Hamdi, and Padilla 
During the 2003–04 Supreme Court term, the Court ruled on its first batch of 
Guantanamo Bay cases. Petitioners in Rasul v. Bush were three British Muslim 
men—Asif Iqbal, Ruhel Ahmed, and Shafiq Rasul—secretly imprisoned as 
enemy combatants at Guantanamo Bay for nearly two and a half years and 
subjected to aggressive interrogation.166 In 2001, the U.S. military took custody 
of the men in Afghanistan and treated them as enemy combatants.167 In 2002, 
Rasul and Iqbal brought a legal challenge based on a denial of due process.  
While their case was pending before the Supreme Court, the men were sent back 
to Britain.168 
The issue presented was whether the six hundred detainees at the American 
naval base in Guantanamo Bay could challenge the legality of their detention in 
U.S. courts on the basis that they were not enemy combatants or terrorists.169 
Petitioners argued that they were humanitarian aid workers who were mistaken 
as combatants, and claimed: (1) no charges were filed against them; (2) they were 
not provided counsel; and (3) they were denied access to the court.170 In a 6–3 
decision written by Justice Stevens, the Court held that United States courts have 
federal jurisdiction to consider challenges to the legality of detention of foreign 
nationals captured abroad in connection with hostilities.171 Stevens reasoned that 
the federal habeas corpus statute confers jurisdiction on the District Court to hear 
claims of non-citizen detainees held at Guantanamo Bay because the statute 
makes no distinction between Americans and aliens held in federal custody.172 
 
166. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004). 
167. See YAMAMOTO ET AL., supra note 30, at 401.   
168. See id.  
169. Rasul, 542 U.S. 466. 
170.  Id. at 472. 
171.  Id. at 466. 
172.  Id. at 483. Fred Korematsu filed an amicus brief in Rasul, and urged that: 
This court should make clear that even in wartime, the United States respects the 
principle that individuals may not be deprived of their liberty except for appropriate 
justifications that are demonstrated in fair hearing, in which they can be tested with the 
assistance of counsel . . . the United States does not constrict fundamental liberties in the 
absence of convincing military necessity . . . even when such necessity is established, 
liberties can be restricted only while preserving some avenue for review comporting with 
the minimum required by due process.  
Geoffrey R. Stone et al., Brief of Amicus Curiae Fred Korematsu in Support of Petitioner, Rasul v. Bush and Al 
Odah v. United States, 29 REV. OF L. & SOC. CHANGE 613, 630 (2005). 
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In a companion case, the Court affirmed the President’s power to indefinitely 
detain members of Al Qaeda and the Taliban. In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, Yasser 
Esam Hamdi, a dual citizen of the United States and the Kingdom of Arabia, 
maintained that he had been mislabeled as a Taliban fighter and was denied due 
process.173 Hamdi was born in Louisiana in 1980.174 As a child, he and his family 
moved to Saudi Arabia.175 He resided in Afghanistan when he was seized by the 
Northern Alliance and turned over to the U.S. military.176 After an initial 
interrogation, Hamdi was removed from Afghanistan to the U.S. Naval Base in 
Guantanamo Bay in January 2002.177 Hamdi’s father, as next friend, filed his 
habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in the Eastern District of Virginia, 
alleging that his son, an American citizen, had no access to legal counsel or 
notice of charges pending against him, in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments.178 The District Court appointed a federal public defender as 
counsel to Hamdi and held that a sole declaration from Michael Mobbs, a 
Defense Department official standing alone, could not support Hamdi’s 
detention.179 On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed and held that no factual 
inquiry or evidentiary hearing was necessary for Hamdi since he was captured in 
an active combat zone.180 
Justice O’Connor wrote the plurality opinion, joined by Chief Justice 
Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy and Breyer, holding that Hamdi must be 
afforded due process, including judicial notice and a fair and meaningful 
opportunity to contest his detention.181 O’Connor emphasized the importance of 
the basic constitutional due process guarantee to prisoners and reasoned that 
Hamdi must be granted the same right and allowed to contest the government’s 
basis for his designation as an enemy combatant.182 Importantly, the Court 
explicitly rejected the administration’s position that enemy combatants are not 
entitled to traditional legal rights: “28 U.S.C. § 2241 makes clear that Congress 
envisions that habeas petitioner should have some opportunity to present and 
 
173. 542 U.S. 507 (2004). 
174. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 510; see also David A. Harris, On the Contemporary Meaning of Korematsu: 
“Liberty Lies in the Hearts of Men and Women,” 76 MO. L. REV. 1, 28 (2011) (“Hamdi actually allows the 
executive to hold American citizens indefinitely, without charges or trial, as enemy combatants.”); Trevor W. 
Morrison, Hamdi’s Habeas Puzzle: Suspension as Authorization, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 411, 412 (2006) (“[T]he 
divisions that [Hamdi] produced, combined with recent changes in the Court’s personnel, suggest that the Court 
has not yet reached a point of stability in this area.”). 
175. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 510 (2004). 
176.  Id. 
177. Id. at 510  
178. Id. at 511. 
179. Id. at 511–12. 
180. Id. at 508. 
181. Id.  
182. Id.  
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rebut facts and that courts have discretion to vary the ways that is 
accomplished.”183 Likewise, it rejected the government’s claim that providing 
due process to enemy combatants would be a significant distraction to military 
officers on the battlefield.184 
In his concurrence joined by Justice Ginsburg, Justice Souter specifically 
argued that Hamdi was entitled to release under the Non-Detention Act of 1971, 
which states, “No citizen shall be imprisoned or otherwise detained by the United 
States except pursuant to an Act of Congress.”185 Here, the Japanese internment 
was prominent on Justice Souter’s mind. He devoted several passages to 
discussing the internment case decisions and made several key points about the 
requirement of a clear statement from Congress with respect to detention of U.S. 
citizens in a time of war.186 According to Souter, “Congress repealed the 
[emergency Detention Act of 1950] and adopted § 4001(a) for the purpose of 
avoiding another Korematsu, it intended to preclude reliance on vague 
constitutional authority . . . for detention or imprisonment at the discretion of the 
[e]xecutive . . . Congress necessarily meant to require a congressional enactment 
that clearly authorized detention or imprisonment.”187 
Hamdi’s callback to Endo continues beyond the Court’s opinion. Following 
the ruling, the Justice Department agreed to release Hamdi after more than two 
years of detention, during which time no charges were filed and lawyers were 
withheld.188 Hamdi was released and returned to Saudi Arabia, conditioned on 
him giving up his U.S. citizenship, renouncing terrorism, and agreeing not to sue 
the U.S. government.189 The renunciation required of Hamdi echoes the 
experiences of Japanese Americans during World War II. Aside from Hamdi’s 
case and the government’s exchange of five Taliban prisoners held in 
Guantanamo Bay for Sergeant Bowe Bergdahl in 2014, no other detainees have 
been freed at the time of this writing.190 
The far-reaching consequence of Hamdi is its expansion of Executive 
Authority because the Court’s acceptance of the enemy combatant category 
 
183. Id. at 526; see also BISKUPIC, supra note 154 at 337 (“[T]he [Hamdi] decision struck the core of the 
Bush administration system for holding foreign terrorism suspects and, more generally, the president’s authority 
in war-related matters and international obligations.”). 
184. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 526–28. 
185. Id. at 541–42 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a)). 
186.  Id. at 539–54. 
187. Id. at 544–45. 
188. See Richard B. Schmitt, U.S. Will Free Louisiana-Born “Enemy Combatant,” L.A. TIMES, Sept. 23, 
2004, at A25 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
189. See Abigail Lauer, Note, The Easy Way Out?: The Yaser Hamdi Release Agreement and the United 
States’ Treatment of the Citizen Enemy Combatant Dilemma, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 927, 936–40 (2006). 
190. Bergdahl who walked off his post in Afghanistan in 2009 and was captured by Taliban insurgents. 
See Jim Michaels, Bergdahl, Faces Highest Court-Martial, USA TODAY, Dec. 15, 2015, at 1A (on file with The 
University of the Pacific Law Review). 
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permits the government to exercise expansive military detention power.191 After 
Hamdi, both an enemy combatant apprehended on the battlefield and an alleged 
supporter of al Qaeda arrested in the United States can be detained under the 
Hamdi rationale.192 
Endo appeared again in Rumsfeld v. Padilla,193 which was decided on the 
same day as Rasul and Hamdi.194 Jose Padilla is a U.S citizen who was detained 
by the Department of Defense pursuant to the President’s determination that he is 
an “enemy combatant” who conspired with al Qaeda to carry out terrorist attacks 
in the United States. Padilla was apprehended by F.B.I. agents as he flew from 
Pakistan to Chicago O’Hare International Airport on May 8, 2002, on the basis of 
a material witness warrant in connection with a grand jury investigation of the 
September 11th terrorist attacks.195 Padilla’s counsel moved to vacate the 
warrant. While that was pending, Bush issued an order to Secretary of Defense 
Donald Rumsfeld designating Padilla as an “enemy combatant” and directing the 
Secretary to detain him in military custody.196 Padilla was moved to South 
Carolina two days before Padilla’s counsel, as next friend, filed a habeas corpus 
petition in the Southern District under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, claiming that his 
client’s military detention violated the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments and 
the Suspension Clause of the U.S. Constitution.197 The petition named President 
Bush, Secretary Rumsfeld, and Melanie Marr, Commander of the consolidated 
Naval Brig, as respondents.198 
The district court held that: (1) Rumsfeld was a proper respondent and 
jurisdiction over him existed under New York’s long-arm statute because of his 
“personal involvement” in Padilla’s military custody; and (2) The President has 
authority to detain an enemy combatant captured on American soil during a time 
of war.199 In reversing that decision, the Second Circuit held that the President 
and AUMF lacked authority to detain Padilla militarily.200 On appeal, the Court 
limited its analysis to the procedural issues and avoided addressing the merits of 
 
191.  See Hafertz, Military, supra note 154, at 38.  
192.  Id.; Elsea, supra note 95, at 50 (“Although Hamdi may be read to apply due process rights only in 
the case of U.S. citizens, legislation that applies in a different way to non-resident aliens, for example without 
mandating any sort of hearing at all, may raise constitutional issues.”). But see Chemerinsky, supra note 129, at 
74 (“In Hamdi and Padilla] the Court should have concluded that the President has no authority to detain 
American citizens as enemy combatants.”). 
193.  542 U.S. 426 (2004). 
194.  Id.; Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004). 
195. Padilla, 542 U.S. at 430. 
196. Id. 
197.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. 
198. Padilla, 542 U.S. at 430. 
199. Id. at 432–33. 
200. Id. at 434. 
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Padilla’s case.201 Reminiscent of the camp cases, the Court held that the (1) 
District Court of South Carolina, not the Southern District of New York, had 
jurisdiction over Padilla’s habeas petition; and (2) that Melanie A. Marr, 
Commander in North Carolina, not Secretary Rumsfeld, was the proper 
respondent in the petition.202 
Endo was interpreted in varying ways. First, Padilla cited Endo in his 
petition, arguing that the Southern District of New York had maintained 
jurisdiction over him.203 This argument was rejected in the majority opinion 
written by Chief Justice Rehnquist when it interpreted Endo as the narrow 
exception to the “immediate physical custodian” rule.204 From the Court’s 
vantage point, Endo might appear to support Padilla’s argument that Secretary 
Rumsfeld is the proper respondent because he exercises the “legal reality of 
control.” However, “Endo does not fit in the analysis because it did not pose the 
issue of whether a petitioner may properly name as respondent someone who is 
not the immediate physical custodian.”205 Rehnquist explained that Endo only 
stands for the limited proposition that, “when the government moves a habeas 
petitioner after he properly files a petition naming her immediate custodian, the 
district court retains justification and may direct the writ to any respondent within 
its jurisdiction who has legal authority to effectuate the prisoner release.”206 
Rehnquist insisted that in Padilla’s case, he was moved from New York to South 
Carolina before the habeas petition was filed and, thus, the Southern District 
never had jurisdiction over Padilla’s petition.207 He construed Padilla’s argument 
as a request for a new exception to the immediate custodian rule based upon 
Padilla’s “unique facts.” He then determined that there were no unique facts and, 
therefore, no departure from the rule was necessary.208 
However, Justice Stevens’ dissent, joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and 
Breyer, countered the majority. Stevens explained that the case was exceptional 
and raised “questions of profound importance.”209 Stevens cited Endo for the 
proposition that, under a functional interpretation, the focus should be placed on 
Secretary Rumsfeld, who is the person with the power to produce the body 
because it was he who determined Padilla’s location pursuant to the President’s 
order.210 As a practical matter, Stevens asserted that the Southern District of New 
 
201. Padilla v. Hanft, 423 F.3d 386, 390–91 (2005). 
202. Id. at 434. 
203.  Id. at 395. 
204.  Padilla, 542 U.S. at 435. 
205.  Id. at 442. 
206. Id. at 441. 
207. Id. at 448–49. 
208. Id. 
209.  Id. at 455 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
210.  Id. at 461. 
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York was the more appropriate place to litigate Padilla’s petition because, (1) the 
government initially selected that court when it sought the material witness 
warrant, and (2) the judge and counsel in New York had greater familiarity with 
the case.211 
After the Court’s ruling, Padilla’s downward spiral continued on remand. 
This time, Padilla filed his petition for writ of habeas corpus in the district of 
South Carolina.212 After the district court held that the President lacked authority 
for Padilla’s’ detention and that he must be criminally charged or released, the 
government appealed to the Fourth Circuit. This Court reversed the district 
court’s ruling and held that detention of Padilla was authorized by the AUMF, as 
interpreted in Hamdi.213 The Fourth Circuit rejected Padilla’s Endo-based claim 
that a clear Congressional statement authorizing his detention was needed and 
that AUMF alone was not a clear statement.214 Interpreting Endo, the panel 
reasoned that “if a wartime statute was silent on detention, it did not mean that 
power to detain was lacking.” 215 
Following these Supreme Court rulings, many detainees received judicial 
hearings though federal courts, which evaluated the legitimacy of their 
detentions.216 Coinciding with the unconditional release of many detainees, an 
unrelenting Bush administration created “a rigged system of military status 
tribunals intended to ratify prior determinations that prisoners were ‘enemy 
combatants’ and to prevent habeas hearings from going forward in federal courts, 
where the administration’s allegations might be carefully scrutinized.”217 
Congress then codified the CSRT process in the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 
(DTA),218 which purportedly prohibited courts and judges from considering writs 
of habeas filed by aliens detained in Guantanamo Bay,219 and permitted 
 
211.  Id. at 461. 
212.  Padilla v. Hanft, 423 F.3d 386, 396 (2005). 
213. Id.  
214. Id. at 395. 
215. Id. at 395. 
216. See YAMAMOTO, supra note 30, at 406. 
217. See HAFERTZ, HABEAS, supra note 14, at 5; see also Richard H. Fallon, The Supreme Court, Habeas 
Corpus, and the War on Terror: An Essay on Law and Political Science, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 352, 354 (2010) 
(“The Court’s Decision in Rasul v. Bush and Hamdan v. Rumsfeld each provoked Congress to enact a statute 
purporting to withdraw federal habeas corpus jurisdiction to review the lawfulness of the detentions of 
noncitizens held by the United States as enemy combatants.”). 
218.  Detainee Treatment Act, 119 U.S.C. § 2739 (2005) (providing procedures for review of detainees’ 
status). 
219.  Id.; see also Linda Greenhouse, The Mystery of Guantanamo Bay: Jefferson Lecture University of 
California, Berkeley, September 17, 2008, 27 BERKELEY J. OF INT’L LAW 1, 12 (2009) (explaining that Section 
1005(e)(c) of the DTA was a “jurisdiction-stripping provision, which had been sponsored by one of the 
Administration’s strongest allies in the Senate, Lindsey Graham of South Carolina, purported to apply to 
pending petitions as well as future ones. The Administration moved immediately to dismiss all the petitions 
then pending in district court—some 180 petitions on behalf of 300 detainees, roughly half of 300 detainees, 
roughly half the population of Guantanamo prison.”). 
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Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRTs) to determine whether Guantanamo 
detainees were enemy combatants.220 In the following year, Congress, through 
the Military Commissions Act (MCA), added that the DTA applied 
retroactively.221 
2. 2006–08: The Last Guantanamo Bay Detainees to Reach the Supreme 
Court: Hamdan and Boumediene 
Fast forward to the last two Guantanamo cases to reach the Supreme Court’s 
docket. In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,222 the Court held that the Executive is bound to 
comply with the rule of law and the authorization for the military to use this 
special military commission to try Hamdan.223 Petitioner Salim Ahmed Hamdan, 
a Yemeni national and one-time driver and bodyguard for Osama bin Laden, had 
been detained at Guantanamo Bay since 2002.224 On July 3, 2003, President Bush 
determined that Hamdan and five other detainees at Guantanamo Bay were 
eligible for trial by military commission, and Hamdan was charged with one 
count of conspiracy to commit offense triable by military commission.225 A year 
later, Military counsel was subsequently appointed to represent Hamdan.226 Two 
months later, counsel filed demands for charges and a speedy trial.227 The legal 
adviser to the Appointing Authority denied the applications, ruling that Hamdan 
was not entitled to any protections of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.228 
Eventually, the Government charged him with the offense.229 
Hamdan filed petitions for writs of habeas corpus and mandamus to 
challenge the Executive Branch’s means of prosecuting his charge, arguing that 
the Military Commission lacked authority to try him because: (1) neither 
congressional Act nor the common law of war supported trial by this commission 
 
220. An enemy combatant was defined by the Department of Defense as “an individual who was part of 
or supporting Taliban or al Qaeda forces, or associate forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United 
States or its coalition partners. This includes “any person who has committed a belligerent acts or has directly 
supported hostilities in aid of enemy armed forces.” Memorandum from Deputy of Defense Paul Wolfowitz 
Order Establishing Combatant Status Review Tribunal (July 7, 2004), available at 
http://www.defense.gov/news/July 2004/d200407007review.pdf (on file with The University of the Pacific Law 
Review). But see Tashima War, supra note 155, at 245 (“To circumvent Rasul, the Administration designed the 
CSRT system to deprive detainees of all procedural rights inherent in our legal system.”). 
221. See YAMAMOTO ET AL., supra note 30, at 406; Cole, supra note 165 (explaining that Congress 
enacted the Military Commissions Act in response to Hamdan). 
222. Oregon v. Guzek, 546 U.S. 517, 557 (2006). 
223. Id. at 591. 
224.  Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 570 (2006). 
225.  Id. at 566. 
226.  Id. at 569. 
227.  Id.  
228.  Id.  
229. Id. at 567. 
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for the crime of conspiracy; and (2) the procedures adopted by the President 
violated the most basic tenants of military and international law, including the 
principle that a defendant must be permitted to see and hear the evidence against 
him.230 The district court granted Hamdan’s writ of habeas.231 The Court of 
Appeals reversed.232 Yet, Hamdan eventually won his case when the Court held 
that the DTA does not authorize the commission.233  
The Court also criticized the lack of authority of the commission process. It 
explained that the commission established by Executive Order was not the proper 
forum to try Hamdan because it allows hearsay evidence but precludes live 
testimony.234 The government alleged Hamdan committed a violation of the law-
of-war, but the Court rejected that argument and stated, “The Government has 
failed even to offer a merely colorable case for inclusion of conspiracy among 
those offenses cognizable by law-of-war military commission.”235 
Again, there are echoes of Endo in Hamdan. Writing for the Court, Justice 
Stevens determined that although Hamdan was accused of making a potentially 
criminal agreement before the September 11, 2001 attacks and before the AUMF, 
the offense was not a wartime offense that occurred during battle.236 In Endo, the 
Court determined that the authorization for internment did not extend to an 
individual’s detention, and in Hamdan, the Court reasoned that the AUMF did 
not authorize military commissions.237 
Like the earlier detainees decisions, Congress responded to Hamdan by 
enacting the Military Commission Act of 2006,238 which authorizes the military 
commission to conduct trials for violations of the law-of-war, and is designed to 
deny habeas corpus to any noncitizen held as an “enemy combatant,” not just 
those held at Guantanamo Bay.239 Two years later, in Boumediene v. Bush,240 the 
Court, in the most significant of the Guantanamo rulings thus far, addressed two 
issues: (1) whether thirty-seven Guantanamo Bay detainees designated as enemy 
combatants have the constitutional privilege of habeas corpus, which is a 
 
230. Id.  
231. Id.  
232. Id.  
233. Id. at 594. 
234. Id. at 612. 
235. Id. at 610. 
236.  Id. at 599–600. 
237.  Id. 
238.  Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006). 
239. See HAFERTZ, HABEAS, supra note 14, at 5. But see Devins, supra note 155 (“In eliminating habeas 
filings, Congress did not intent to pick up a knock-down fight with the courts. Just as the DTA recognized an 
important judicial role while eliminating habeas filings, the MCA likewise was premised on the view that 
habeas filings both clogged the courts and ‘hampered the war effort.’”). 
240. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008). 
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privilege that cannot be denied unless permitted by the Suspension Clause,241 and 
(2) whether the DTA offered an adequate and effective substitute for habeas 
corpus.242 
Justice Kennedy, writing for a 5–4 majority, held that the Guantanamo Bay 
detainees had the right to file petitions for the writ of habeas corpus, and that the 
DTA was an inadequate substitute for habeas corpus.243 For the first time, the 
Court invalidated a statute as a violation of the Suspension Clause.244 In 
restricting Congress’ power to limit the courts’ habeas jurisdiction, the majority 
boldly professed, “Where a person is detained by executive order, rather than 
after being tried and convicted in a court, the need for collateral review is most 
pressing . . . In this context, the need for habeas corpus is most urgent.”245 The 
Court also noted in dicta that sometimes the length of time it takes for the habeas 
review process is extraordinary: 
In some of these cases six years have elapsed without the judicial 
oversight that habeas corpus or an adequate substitute demands. There 
has been no showing that the Executive facts such onerous burdens that it 
cannot respond to habeas corpus actions. To require these detainees to 
completed DTA review before proceeding with their habeas actions 
would be to require additional months, if not years, of delay. The first 
DTA review applications were filed over two years ago, but no decisions 
on the merits have been issue. The costs of delay can no longer be borne 
by those who are held in custody, review is most pressing.246 
Just as important, the Court acknowledged that constitutional protections 
were not necessarily limited by territory and citizenship and advanced a 
functional test considering a detainee’s citizenship, adequacy of any prior non-
judicial process received, and practical obstacles to habeas review.247 In the 
Court’s view, the DTA’s limited judicial review was an inadequate substitute for 
habeas review because the detainees did not have an opportunity to present 
evidence.248 In testimony before Congress, Neal Katyal, counsel to Hamdan, 
 
241. Id. at 2231 (citing Art. 1 § 9, cl. 2). 
242.  Id. 
243.  Id.  
244.  See Jonathan Hafetz, Calling the Government to Account: Habeas Corpus in the Aftermath of 
Boumediene, 57 WAYNE L. REV. 99, 101 (2011) [hereinafter Hafetz Calling] (“Boumediene marked the first 
time the Court invalidated a statute because it violated the Suspension Clause.”). 
245.  Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2269. 
246. Id. at 2275. 
247. See also Fallon, supra note 217, at 397 (noting that the Supreme Court was unwilling to interpret the 
Constitution as allowing the Executive almost total authority to detain anyone it wants based on a claim of 
national security). 
248. Id. 
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added, “After Boumediene, detainees held at Guantanamo Bay have a 
constitutionally protected right to have an Article III court review the legality of 
their detention in a habeas corpus action.”249 In considering the lack of due 
process Guantanamo Bay detainees face, Judge Tashima advocated for hearings 
before an impartial judge that allow meaningful due process and assure detainees 
(1) the right to counsel, (2) the right to be present at all critical stages of the 
proceedings, (3) the right to confront witnesses, and (4) that only reliable 
evidence is considered.250 
Unfortunately, as analyzed in the next section, seven years later, 
Boumediene’s promise has not been fulfilled by lower courts, in part because of 
the opinion’s failure to explain what the Government had to prove in 
Guantanamo habeas proceedings.251 
IV. POST-BOUMEDIENE LITIGATION PIPELINE IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA: 
WAITING TO LOSE 
After Boumediene called for meaningful habeas corpus review of detention 
cases, district judges met in executive session and decided to coordinate 
proceedings in Guantanamo habeas cases.252 On November 6, 2008, coordinating 
Senior Judge Hogan issued a case management order stating that the government 
should bear the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that a 
petitioner’s detention is lawful.253 Relying on the order, district courts have 
issued many release orders for detainees, only to have most of them overturned 
by the D.C. Circuit.254 
In over eighty cases from 2008–2010, the D.C. Circuit and district court, 
having jurisdiction over most detainee cases, have generally held that terrorism 
 
249.  Implications of the Supreme Court’s Boumediene Decision for Detainees at Guantanamo Bay, 
Cuba: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Armed Services, 110th Cong. 11 (2008) (statement of Neal Katyal, 
Prof. of Law, Geo. U.L. Center); see also Stephen I. Vladeck, The D.C. Circuit After Boumediene, 41 SETON 
HALL L. REV. 1451, 1467 (2011) (“A closer reading of Boumediene suggest that Guantanamo detainees should 
receive more process than those who seek to use habeas collaterally to attack state court convictions since either 
detention does not result from convictions obtained in a court of record.”). If there were more terrorist attacks in 
the U.S. following September 11th, would the Court have ruled the way it did in Rasul, Hamdi, Hamdan, and 
Boumediene? If there are terrorist attacks in the U.S. on a large scale, would the government attempt to detain 
masses of people under the auspices of the NDAA, and would courts allow it to? 
250.  Tashima War, supra note 155, at 264. 
251. See Hafertz, Reconceptualizing, supra note 163, at 1089 (“The Court left it to the lower courts to 
resolve the various evidentiary and procedural issues presented by the habeas litigation in the first instance.”). 
252. See In re Guantanamo Bay Detainees Litig., 577 F. Supp. 2d 310 (D.D.C. 2008). 
253. Id. 
254. See MARK DENBEAUX ET AL., NO HEARING HABEAS: D.C. CIRCUIT RESTRICTS MEANINGFUL 
REVIEW 1 (2012) (“Boumedine’s promise of robust review of the legality of the Guantanamo detainees 
detention has been effectively negated by decisions of U.S. Court of Appeals for the District Columbia 
Circuit”). 
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suspects may be held in Guantanamo Bay without trial when the government 
proves, by a preponderance of evidence, that they are part of, or “purposefully 
and materially support,” al Qaeda, the Taliban, or associated forces.255 This lower 
evidentiary threshold makes it easier for the government to prove its case, which 
in turn makes it more difficult for a detainee to succeed in habeas. Professor 
Hafertz expounded on this issue: “Subject to habeas review of its factual 
assertions the government can detain individuals indefinitely based on their 
loosely defined membership in or provision of unspecified support for al-Qaeda 
or an associated group regardless of whether they committed a hostile act or 
engaged in any terrorist plot or activity.”256 
Pivotal to this discussion is Al-Adahi v. Obama,257 which was the first time 
the Circuit reversed a district court’s grant of habeas relief in a post-Boumediene 
case.258 The Court of Appeals held that Al-Adahi’s detention might be legal if the 
Government has “some evidence” to support captivity of Al-Adahi, who the 
Court deemed was likely linked to al-Qaeda.259 Under this preponderance 
standard, the court denied Al-Adahi’s habeas petition.260 
Al-Adahi’s case proceeded at a snail’s pace for almost six years before the 
ruling.261 The facts of Al-Adahi’s case are similar to other Guantanamo cases 
involving detainees found in Afghanistan who were captured in certain location, 
and/or who were considered to have been associated with terrorist organizations 
or figures. Mohammed Al-Adahi, a Yemi security guard, moved to Afghanistan 
and stayed with a close associate of Usama bin Laden.262 Al-Adahi moved into a 
guesthouse used as a staging area for al-Qaeda recruits, and attended al-Qaeda’s 
Al Farouq training camp where September 11th terrorists trained.263 After 
sustaining injuries, he crossed the Pakistani border on a bus carrying wounded 
Arab and Pakistani fighters.264 In late 2001, Pakistani authorities captured Al-
Adahi.265 In 2004, a CSRT determined, by a preponderance of evidence, that he 
 
255. See Hafertz, Military, supra note 154, at 39.  
256. Jonathan Hafertz, Detention Without End? Reexamining the Indefinite Confinement of Terrorism 
Suspects Through the Law of Criminal Sentencing, 61 UCLA L. REV. 326, 363 (2014) [hereinafter Hafertz, 
Detention]. 
257.  Al-Adahi v. Obama, 613 F. 3d 1102 (2010). 
258.  Hafertz, Reconceptualizing, supra note 163, at 1093–97 (“Since the D.C. Circuit began reviewing 
district habeas decision and articulating rules that make it more difficult for a detainee to prevail, district courts 
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Circuit decisions.”). 
259. Al-Adahi, 613 F. 3d at 1104. 
260.  Id. at 1111. 
261.  Habeas Corpus Petition at 2, Al-Adahi v. Obama (2009) (No. 05-280). 
262.  Id. at 1102. 
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264.  Id. at 1102–03. 
265.  Id. at 1103. 
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was part of al-Qaeda.266 Al-Adahi filed his habeas corpus petition in 2004, which 
presented the issue of whether he was part of al-Qaeda and therefore, justifiably 
detained under the AUMF.267 
Judge Randolph, writing for the panel, offered a strong critique of District 
Judge Kessler’s analysis and concluded the district court erred in determining 
there was no reliable evidence that Al-Adahi was a member of al-Qaeda and of 
the Taliban.268 The panel determined that Al-Adahi and al-Qaeda’s close 
association made it more likely that he was part of the organization.269 Judge 
Randolph wrote that district judges must take a “conditional probability” analysis 
in reviewing the evidence in order to deduce the following: (1) Al Nebra was in a 
staging area for al-Qaeda recruits who were in route to the Al Farouq training 
camp; (2) Al-Adahi was treated as a recruit and was instructed about packing and 
preparing for training; and (3) he entered Al-Qaeda’s al-Farouq training camp, 
which was the former training grounds for eight of the September 11th hijackers, 
and is where he received instruction and training in rocket-propelled grenades 
and weapons.270 However, the Circuit’s analysis conflicts with the intent and 
spirit of Hamdi, wherein the Court stressed: 
The burden of proof standard of “some evidence” is inadequate because 
any process in which the Executive’s factual assertions go wholly 
unchallenged or are simply presumed correct without any opportunity for 
the alleged combatant to demonstrate otherwise falls constitutionally 
short. It is ill suited to the situation in which a habeas petitioner has 
received no prior proceedings before any tribunal and had no prior 
opportunity to rebut factual assertions before a neutral decision maker.271 
This is the current law in the D.C. Circuit because certiorari was denied in 
Al-Adahi. Its repercussions were immediately felt. Professors Mark Denbeaux 
and Jonathan Hafertz provide empirical proof to support the assertion that it is 
almost impossible for a petitioner to succeed under Al-Adahi’s low evidentiary 
standard. In their study examining the outcomes of habeas review after 
Boumedine, they suggest that since Al-Adahi, the D.C. Circuit has consistently 
denied Guantanamo Bay detainees’ habeas petitions.272 Amazingly, before Al-
Adahi, fifty-nine percent of the thirty-four habeas petitions were granted. 
However, after Al-Adahi, ninety-two percent of twelve filed habeas petitions 
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271.  See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 537 (2004). 
272.  See DENBEAUX ET AL., supra note 254, at 1. 
The University of the Pacific Law Review / Vol. 47 
825 
were denied.273 Based on these statistics, they concluded, “judicial deference to 
the government is the new norm.”274 
Latif v. Obama underscores Denbeaux and Hafertz’s thesis.275 Latif v. Obama 
was the only habeas petition granted after Al-Adahi, which further illustrates the 
court’s pattern of deferring to the government.276 This case allows the 
government to use a single official report to prove that a petitioner’s detention is 
lawful.277 In its prosecution, the government relied on a heavily redacted report 
indicating that Latif traveled to Afghanistan in 2001, received weapons from the 
Taliban, and was stationed on the front line against the Northern Alliance.278  
Adian Farhan Latif challenged the summation of his testimony and argued that 
the statements were misunderstood or misattributed to him, and that he left 
Yemen in 2001 to seek medical treatment for head injuries he sustained in a 1994 
car accident.279 
Judge Rogers Brown, writing for the court, narrowly read Boumediene and 
concluded that, “intelligence documents of the sort at issue here are entitled to a 
presumption of regularity, and second that neither internal flaws nor external 
record evidence rebuts that presumption in this case.”280 According to Judge 
Rogers Brown, a presumption of regularity means that “the government official 
accurately identified the source and accurately summarized his statement, but it 
implies nothing about the truth of the underlying non-government source’s 
statement.”281 Therefore, the D.C Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of 
Abdul Latif’s habeas petition and held that district courts must presume that 
government reports regarding interrogations are accurate, even though district 
courts previously found those reports unreliable.282 
V. THE NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT OF 2012 
This article has discussed how military commissions prosecute war crimes 
and has explained the difficulties Guantanamo Bay detainees face when 
petitioning for habeas corpus relief. The following section explores how a person 
held for aiding al Qaeda, ISIL, or some other terrorist organization, by providing 
material support for terrorism may be prosecuted in federal court and indefinitely 
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278. Id. at 1176. 
279. Id. at 1177. 
280. Id. at 1179. 
281. Id. at 1181. 
282. Id. at 1176. 
2016 / Habeas Corpus, Civil Liberties, and Indefinite Detention During Wartime 
826 
detained under the AUMF.283 Significantly, none of the Guantanamo Bay rulings 
thus far provide a definitive answer to whether the President can indefinitely 
detain a suspected terrorist who was arrested in the United States.284 
A. Legal Authority for Indefinitely Detained U.S. Citizens in America 
In their article, Congressional Authorization and the War on Terrorism,285 
Professors Curtis Bradley and Jack Goldsmith argue that the AUMF applies in 
the U.S. if the enemy is found in the country. They point out, “The AUMF is 
silent on what procedures are available for someone detained in the U.S. under 
the AUMF,”286 and “due to the silence, an enemy combatant may be detained 
indefinitely.”287 For guidance in defining a clear rule statement to determine 
when U.S. citizens’ constitutional rights are implicated, the professors relied on 
Endo and reasoned that it could be used as precedent.288 
Specifically, Bradley and Goldsmith argue that: (1) the text of the AUMF 
imposes no geographic limitation; (2) the AUMF was passed after the September 
11 attacks when there was “strong suspicion that enemy terrorist cells still lurked 
within the country; and (3) delegation principles and historical practice support 
the conviction.289 They claim the historical practice stems from the U.S. 
detaining Japanese Americans during World War II, which authorizes the 
President to use all necessary and appropriate force against them.290 Bradley and 
Goldsmith reiterate the connection between Endo and the Guantanamo cases 
when they assure readers that petitioners can still use habeas to challenge such a 
detention after Hamdi.291 However, the scholars overlook the fact that, similar to 
the Guantanamo Bay detainee cases, habeas relief is an inadequate remedy in 
cases where American citizens on U.S. soil are detained under the National 
 
283. See Stephen I. Vladeck, Detention After the AUMF, 12 FORDHAM L. REV. 2189, 2193–94 (2014) 
(stating that the “AUMF preserves detention authority for current Guantanamo detainees”). 
284. See Hafetz Calling, supra note 244, at 147 (noting the lack of a definitive answer on the issue of 
Presidential authority to detain a suspect terrorist arrested in the U.S. since there have been only extraterritorial 
services). 
285. Curtis Bradley & Jack Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War on Terrorism, 118 
HARV. L. REV. 2047, 2118 (2005). 
286. Id. at 2121. 
287. Id. at 2124. But see Sarah Erickson-Muschko, Beyond Individual Status: The Clear Statement Rule 
and the Scope of the AUMF Detention Authority in the United States, 101 GEO. L. J. 1399, 1400 (2013) 
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U.S. territory.”). 
288. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 285, at 2104; see also Erickson-Muschko, supra note 287, at 
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persons arrested in the U.S.). 
289. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 285, at 2104.  
290. Id. at 2119. 
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Defense Authorization Act of 2012 (NDAA).292 Even if the petition survives all 
of the procedural hurdles that must be cleared, it takes too long to get a court to 
review the substantive issues of the petition. If the merits of the petition are 
addressed, all the government has to do is meet a preponderance of the evidence 
standard in courts that pay undue deference to the government.293 At bottom, if 
the President chooses to detain an American under the AUMF, a court will have 
to decide the issue.294 Acknowledging as much in his response to Bradley and 
Goldsmith’s piece, Professor Mark Tushnet compared the facts of Endo with the 
fictional internment of Arab Americans in the Denzel Washington movie, The 
Siege,295 to pose the question of whether such action can be authorized by the 
AUMF: 
Imagine this scenario: After a series of bombings in New York, the 
President directs U.S. armed forces to round up Arab American males 
over the age of fifteen in the New York metropolitan area and confine 
them in a sports stadium, those who the military officers determine pose 
no continuing threat to domestic security are released back to their 
communities, a process that predictably will lead to some detentions 
lasting a month or more.296 
Tushnet’s hypothetical deserves greater consideration because mass 
detention of Americans in a major U.S. city could actually happen. It has been 
almost ten years since Bradley, Goldsmith, and Tushnet wrote their analyses of 
the AUMF, and their concerns about a real Siege-like event happening are further 
encouraged with NDAA’s enactment in 2012. What happens if there is a series of 
large-scale terrorist incidents, close in time, in the United States? Amidst the 
immediate shock, anger, fear, and outcry, will the President choose to corral 
individuals or groups under suspicions based on the NDAA, which provides the 
authority to do so?297 These concerns about indefinitely holding U.S. citizens, 
without providing them any due process because the U.S. government deems 
 
292.  National Defense Authorization Act of 2012 (NDAA), P.L. 112-81, 125 Stat. 1298 (2001). 
293.  See Vladeck, supra note 249, at 1467 (asserting that “the government is be more likely to prevail 
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295.  The Siege, (Twentieth Century Fox 1998); see also Natsu Taylor Saito, Symbolism Under Siege: 
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296. Mark V. Tushnet, Controlling Executive Power in the War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2673, 
2763 (2005). 
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war on terrorism after another terrorist attack in the U.S.). 
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them to be associated with terrorists, are real. Exacerbating these concerns is the 
emerging threat of ISIL-inspired terrorists in the United States. As the ISIL-
inspired mass shooting in San Bernardino in December 2015 has shown, there is 
a growing domestic threat here. Since March 2014, seventy-one ISIL followers, 
most of whom were U.S. citizens or permanent residents, have been arrested.298 
B. A Closer Look at the NDAA Through Statutory Interpretation 
For the first time, Congress attempted to codify a substantive detention 
standard as part of the NDAA. The 2012 NDAA supports an expansive reading 
of the 2001 AUMF’s detention authority.299 Since 2009, President Obama, like 
President Bush before him, has continued to indefinitely detain suspected 
terrorists without charge based on the AUMF.300 
The detention clause, Section 1021 of the 566-page Act—which is still in 
effect—authorizes the United States Armed Forces to detain a covered person 
pursuant to AUMF.301 A covered person under this section is: 
(1) A person who planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist 
attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored those 
responsible for those attacks. 
(2) A person who was a part of or substantially supported al-Qaeda, the 
Taliban, or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against 
the United States or its coalition partners, including any person who 
has committed a belligerent act or has directly supported such 
hostiles in aid of such enemy forces.302 
This sweeping language allows for what Professor Hafertz describes as “the 
potential for an elastic detention power capable of expanding to cover any 
perceived threat as the U.S. focus shifts from al Qaeda in Afghanistan to different 
organizations in other parts of the world.”303 Under the AUMF, a prisoner may 
be held for the duration of hostilities, regardless of the seriousness of his conduct 
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or level of association with a terrorist group.304 Hafertz argues that measures such 
as the NDAA “threaten to cement the transformation of post-9/11 military 
detention powers-created based on the promise of war time exigency—into a 
permanent, default detention, system for an elastic category of terrorism 
cases.”305 This means that these belligerent principles could be applied to U.S. 
citizens. 
Looking at this language, the NDAA “requires” that non-U.S. citizens be 
treated as enemy combatants rather than criminal suspects unless the President 
issues a waiver in the interests of national security.306 However, the NDAA does 
not “require” that U.S. citizens be treated in the same manner as enemy 
combatants.307 Instead, Section 1021(e) provides the following vaguely worded 
protections to U.S. citizens and lawful aliens: “Nothing in this section shall be 
construed to affect the existing law or authorities relating to the detention of 
United States citizens, lawful resident aliens of the United States, or any other 
persons who captured or arrested in the United States.”308 
While the NDAA clearly confirms the AUMF’s authority to indefinitely 
detain individuals without trial, the ambiguities in the NDAA and AUMF make it 
unclear who the AUMF applies to, and how long the authority lasts.309 President 
Obama expressed “serious reservations” about these provisions when he signed 
the NDAA into law on December 31, 2011.310 After explaining that he signed the 
Act primarily because it authorized national defense funding and necessary 
services for service members and their families, President Obama professed that 
that he will not exercise the authority to detain U.S. citizens under the NDAA: 
I want to clarify that my Administration will not authorize the indefinite 
military detention without trial of American citizens . . . My 
administration will interpret section 1021 in a manner that ensures that 
any detention it authorizes complies with the Constitution, the laws of 
 
304. See Hafertz, Detention, supra note 256, at 337 (“Under the AUMF, there is an absence of any 
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incompatible of the liberty interests at stake and the purposes of law-of-war confinement and meaningful 
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305. See Military Detention, supra note 259, at 46.  
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war, and all other applicable law . . . . [U]nder no circumstances will my 
Administration accept or adhere to a rigid across-the-board requirement 
for military detention.311 
C. Hedges v. Obama Raises Offers More Questions than Answers 
The NDAA’s vagueness formed the motivation for a group of writers, 
journalists, and activists to seek a permanent injunction enjoining enforcement of 
Section 1021 of the NDDA in Hedges v. Obama.312 There, District Judge Forrest 
held that Section 1021 was facially overbroad in violation of the First 
Amendment and impermissibly vague in violation of the Fifth Amendment.313 
A broad coalition of private citizens, lawyers, and legislators opposing 
Section 1021 formed the plaintiffs in Hedges v. Obama.314 Christopher Hedges, a 
foreign correspondent and Pulitzer Prize winning journalist, has traveled to the 
Middle East, the Balkans, Africa, and Latin America, interviewed detained al-
Qaeda members, and reported on groups regarded as terrorist organizations.315 
Alexa O’Brien, founder of the Section 4001 U.S. of Day of Rage, wrote articles 
published on Wikileaks’ release of U.S. State Department cables and about 
Guantanamo Bay detainees.316 Kai Wargalla, an organizer and activist based in 
London, is Deputy Director of the organization, Revolution Truth, which 
facilitates international speech activities through website forums.317 Finally, the 
Honorable Brigitta Jonsdottir is a member of parliament in Iceland, and an 
activist and WikiLeaks spokesperson.318 
The government attempted to avoid the constitutional issues by arguing the 
case should be dismissed for lack of standing and mootness.319 The government 
further argued that the district court should be limited to a post-detention habeas 
review.320 But Judge Forrest rejected this claim outright because habeas petitions 
take far too long to resolve and are reviewed under a lesser preponderance of the 
evidence standard by a single judge rather than a sitting jury.321 “If only habeas 
review is available to those detained under Section 1021(b)(2)—even U.S. 
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citizens on U.S. soil—core constitutional rights available in criminal matters 
would simply be eliminated.”322 
The government relied on Ex parte Quirin323 as precedent to argue that the 
Supreme Court has approved of the indefinite detention of a U.S. citizen on U.S. 
soil.324 But Judge Forrest found Quirin to be inapposite to the instant facts.325 
The term “enemy combatant” originated in Quirin, where a U.S. citizen who, 
together with German nationals, landed on the beaches of Long Island, New 
York wearing military uniforms and intending to detonate explosive devices.326 
Whereas, in Hedges, the groups of plaintiffs were not uniformed, carrying 
weapons, or working on behalf of a foreign government, but were concerned 
about possible detention for writing or speaking about enemy forces or for 
“raising questions regarding the legitimacy of American military forces.”327 
After hearing testimony and weighing evidence, Judge Forrest issued a 
preliminary injunction blocking the indefinite detention powers of the NDAA on 
grounds of unconstitutionality.328 The court held that plaintiffs had standing to 
bring their facial challenge, and that the NDAA provision was facially overbroad 
in violation of the First Amendment and impermissibly vague in violation of the 
Fifth Amendment.329 
For the most part, Judge Forrest subjected the AUMF and Section 1021(b)(2) 
to heightened review because they both implicated fundamental liberties.330 In 
rejecting the government’s position that the AUMF and Section 1021(b)(2) are 
coextensive, and finding that the government failed to show why Section 
1021(b)(2) should not be permanently enjoined, Forrest made several distinct 
points to support her conclusion. First, Forrest traced the AUMF and case law 
discussing the President’s detention authority under the AUMF to demonstrate 
that the AUMF set forth detention authority tied directly and only to September 
11, 2001.331 She then decided that the executive branch interpreted its detention 
more broadly without congressional authorization.332 Forrest insisted that unlike 
the AUMF, which is specifically tied to September 11, 2001, Section 1021 is 
not.333 
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As for the First Amendment claims, Forrest declared that the two statutes’ 
differences support factual findings that each plaintiff has a reasonable fear that 
Section 1021(b)(2) presents a new scope for military detentions.334 Significantly, 
Judge Forrest cited to Supreme Court precedent illustrating the exception to the 
injury-in-fact requirement for standing when First Amendment rights might be 
infringed.335 She found that the facts supported each plaintiff’s standing to bring 
a pre-enforcement facial challenge with respect to Section 1021(b)(2).336 She also 
found that “each plaintiff has engaged in activities in which he or she is 
associating with, writing about, or speaking about or to al-Qaeda, the Taliban, or 
other organizations and groups, which have committed terrorists against the 
United States”—actions that fall under the umbrella of Section 1021(b)(2).337 In 
her view, these plaintiffs need not wait until they have been detained and 
imprisoned to bring a challenge—the penalty is too severe to have to wait.338 
Accordingly, Judge Forrest reasoned that an actual case or controversy remained 
based on the plaintiffs’ awareness of the threat of indefinite military detention 
under Section 1021.339 
The court further concluded that there was a Fifth Amendment Due Process 
violation because Section 1021(b)(2) did not provide fair notice of conduct that 
was forbidden or required. 340 Plaintiffs testified they did not understand the 
terms “substantially supported,” “directly supported,” or “associated forces” in 
Section 1021(b)(2).341 Accordingly, Judge Forrest determined that the meanings 
of the terms were unknown, so the scope of Section 1021(b)(2) is therefore 
impermissibly vague under the Fifth Amendment.342 
Finally, the case’s importance and its relationship to the Japanese American 
internment did not escape the court’s attention. Judge Forrest stressed the present 
case posed an important constitutional question and acknowledged “[c]ourts must 
safeguard core constitutional issues.”343 She cited to Korematsu and mentioned 
that the Supreme Court’s deference to the executive and legislative branches 
during World War II is now generally condemned.344 
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However, the government appealed, and the Second Circuit held that the 
NDAA affirmed that the President’s authority under the AUMF345 did not apply 
to citizens, lawful aliens, or individuals captured or arrested in the United 
States.346 Therefore, the plaintiffs lacked standing.347 
The plaintiffs’ victory was short-lived. The Second Circuit panel held that: 
(1) Section 1021(b)(2) affirms the general AUMF authority;348 (2) Section 
1021(b)(2) is Congress’ express resolution of an earlier debated question the 
scope of AUMF’s, which does not limit or expand the detention authority;349 and 
(3) the text indicates that “captured or arrested in the United States” is meant to 
modify only “any other persons.”350 
The Court of Appeals opined that the language of Section 1021 could be 
construed as the AUMF providing the president the authority to detain U.S. 
citizens without trial or charge, or as a completely opposite interpretation.351 The 
thrust of the opinion lies in the panel’s analysis of the Section 1021’s language 
and legislative history. Here, unfortunately, the court’s interpretation reinforces, 
rather than explains, the ambiguous nature of the statute’s terms: 
[I]n stating that Section 1021 is not intended to limit or expand the scope 
of the detention authority, under the AUMF, Section 1021(d) mostly 
made a statement about the original AUMF . . . it only states a limitation 
about how Section 1021 may be construed to affect that existing 
authority, whatever that existing authority may be . . . . Section 1021 (e) 
provides that Section 1021 just does not speak—one way of the other—
to the government’s authority to detain citizens, lawful resident aliens, or 
any other persons captured or arrested in the United States.352 
On the issue of standing, the panel briefly stated that Section 1021 makes no 
assumptions about the government’s authority to detain citizens under the 
AUMF, because the language of the section states that it does not affect existing 
law or authorities.353 The panel acknowledged the constitutional issues posed in 
the case, but decided to avoid them by addressing only the standing issue.354 The 
panel contended that the authorities allow, but do not require, detention and as 
such, Section 1021 only affirms the President’s military authority and can be 
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distinguished from a statute that is penal in nature.355 “There is nothing in Section 
1021 that makes any assumptions about the government’s authority to detain 
citizens under the AUMF.”356 Accordingly, the court concluded that speculation 
and expressed fears are insufficient to establish standing of enforcement.357 Here, 
it appears that the panel’s disagreement with the district court’s treatment of 
Section 1021 as a criminal penalty allowed the panel to essentially sidestep the 
First Amendment issues. 
Noticeably, the Second Circuit did not mention Korematsu or the Japanese 
American internment, even though the district court referred to the case and the 
children of Fred Korematsu, Gordon Hirabayashi, and Minora Yasui, filed an 
amicus brief with the Second Circuit urging it to affirm Judge Forrest’s exacting 
scrutiny of Section 1021 and injunction.358 Amici argued, “The NDAA’s 
indefinite detention scheme echoes the indefinite detention that characterized the 
internment, and, similarly, it is factually unsubstantiated as well as ill-defined 
and overbroad in scope.”359 They stressed that “[t]he federal courts, especially 
the Supreme Court, failed to accord the internment of Japanese Americans the 
exacting scrutiny the government’s wholesale deprivation of constitutional 
liberties demanded.”360 Throughout the brief, amici reminded that the lessons of 
the internment demonstrate the importance of heightened judicial scrutiny of 
government national security measures curtailing civil liberties.361 
Following the Second Circuit’s ruling, the plaintiffs filed an emergency 
application in the Supreme Court, asking it to vacate the Second Circuit’s stay.362 
The Court denied the application and certiorari, thereby missing an opportunity 
to revisit Korematsu.363 Even though the government has yet to use Korematsu as 
judicial precedent to justify indefinite detention in detainee cases, there is no 
guarantee that it will not do so in the future because it can be interpreted as an 
existing legal authority.364 
The Second Circuit’s conclusions failed to resolve the controversy. If nothing 
else, it created more questions. Despite the Second Circuit’s ruling, I would 
argue that the NDAA is also overly broad because, given the statute’s wide 
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reach, anyone who gives to a charity or expresses opinions about terrorism in 
writing or in song may be prosecuted.365 As seen throughout the Hedges 
litigation, government attorneys were unable to define the terms, yet they insist 
on maintaining authority to do so in the future.366 
Mindful of this, will federal agents begin to conduct surveillance on 
individuals who frequent ethnic grocery stores and karate studios? Who rent 
motels with cash? Who make extreme religious statements or statements about 
ongoing violent acts? Or any other conduct construed as having substantially 
supported a “terrorist act” or “belligerent act? Would the conduct of bloggers 
who make anti-U.S. or cryptic statements endorsing violence against the U.S. on 
their websites fall under the purview of the NDAA? Could whistleblowers or 
reporters be detained indefinitely? Would groups like the Tea Party, the Occupy 
Movement, and Black Lives Matter be considered a terrorist group if they engage 
in unlawful activity? Would these groups then be considered threats to national 
security? Based on reasonable fears of indefinite detainment under the NDAA, 
would Americans abstain from associating with others for fear of prosecution? 
Would bloggers refrain from writing anything that could be construed as 
assisting terrorist groups, as defined by the NDDA? Until the terms in the NDAA 
are better defined by Congress, Americans remain in the dark about exactly what 
conduct is proscribed. 
VI. THREE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORM 
Given the current state of habeas review in the D.C. Circuit, and considering 
the time it takes for a habeas petition filed by a Guantanamo detainee, the 
possibility of freedom for any detainee in the foreseeable future appears unlikely. 
In this section, I offer three moderate recommendations for reform: (1) federal 
courts should apply an alternative scheme for determining if and when detainees 
should be released; (2) Congress and the courts should determine when the 
government’s detention authority ends; and (3) courts should apply principles 
adopted from immigration jurisprudence. 
First, Congress and the judiciary could corroboratively develop new rules 
allowing judges to adjudicate and sentence detainees in a way that takes into 
account their past conduct, behavior while in custody, and future dangerousness 
correlated to the crimes they have committed. A new framework for reviewing 
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habeas petitions is necessary. A suggestion for review should not focus strictly 
on the perception that all detainees are foreign terrorists. A meaningful, 
comprehensive court review policy for cases is necessary to honor due process of 
law. Perhaps a workable framework would include factors to be considered in 
evaluating the length of detention. 
On this issue of detainee release, Professor Hafertz argues that because some 
individuals are being held for longer than their prior conduct warrants, an 
alternative review standard based on proportionality and considering an 
individual’s background, prior conduct, as well as future dangerousness in 
detention review, should be relied upon.367 Professors Bradley and Goldsmith 
encourage a determination of whether the detainee possesses a substantial danger 
of rejoining hostilities based on factors such as pre-detention conduct, conduct in 
custody, age, and health. Here, the scholars touch upon the improvidence of 
releasing detainees only after there is an official end of conflict in Afghanistan, 
which may become a new frontier for Guantanamo Bay litigation.368 
Additionally, diplomatic negotiations should be conducted with the detainee’s 
home country and other nations to accept detainees, consistent with the direction 
of detention law across the globe. 
Second, since hostilities against the U.S. could continue indefinitely, the 
detainees could be held indefinitely. Courts have focused almost exclusively on 
the threshold issue of whether a detainee falls within the terms of the AUMF, and 
absent are any real efforts to determine the issue of when the government’s 
detention authority ends as time passes and circumstances change.369 In the 
summer of 2015, the D.C. Circuit addressed who determines the end of hostilities 
for the purposes of AUMF detention in Al Warafi v. Obama.370 It applied the Al- 
Bihani preponderance of the evidence standard, held that the President’s 
speeches were not law, and denied al Warafi’s petition for writ of habeas 
corpus.371 Mukhto Yahia Najial al Warafi was captured by the Northern Alliance 
in Afghanistan in November 2001.372 The U.S took custody of him and have 
detained him at Guantanamo since 2002.373 He filed for a writ of habeas corpus 
in 2004, which was denied in 2010. He challenged the legality of detention at 
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Guantanamo Bay.374 The court previously denied al Warafi’s first challenge of 
his detention at Guantanamo Bay by finding that the government had shown that 
al Warafi more likely than not belonged to the Taliban when captured.375 This 
time around, the government argued that determining when hostilities have ended 
is reserved for the political branches, while al Warafi claimed that the President 
can determine when a conflict is over.376 He cited to a number of speeches 
wherein the President stated that America’s war in Afghanistan is coming to an 
end or that it is over, referring to the withdrawal of U.S. troops.377 He considered 
the President’s stance on the existence of hostilities as being conclusive.378 
Rejecting this argument, the panel concluded that the President’s speeches are 
not dispositive as to the existence of active hostilities.379 Although not mentioned 
in Al Warafi, terrorism continues across the world and hostilities against the U.S. 
can go on indefinitely. 
Third, while the government has relied on immigration law and policies to 
detain people, perhaps immigration jurisprudence can assist courts in determining 
whether judicial review beyond habeas review is called for. A court may apply 
legal reasoning from deportation jurisprudence as an aid in determining the 
constitutionality of a prolonged mandatory detention imposed by the government 
without any possibility of review. For instance, in Rodriguez v. Robbins, the 
Ninth Circuit held that hearings are necessary to ensure that immigrants were not 
needlessly held.380 Freedom from physical restraint and imprisonment lies at the 
heart of the Due Process Clause.381 Detention should be time-limited. The 
Guantanamo detainees are indefinitely imprisoned. In Zadvydas v. Davis, the 
Court held that habeas corpus proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 “remain 
available as a forum for statutory and constitutional challenges to post-removal-
period detention,” and indefinite detention of a removable alien after a removal 
proceeding violates a due process right.382 In Zadvydas, the Court considered the 
indefinite detention of two long-time resident aliens who were ordered to be 
removed from the U.S. as a consequence of crimes they committed, but no 
country was willing to accept either of the individuals once they were ordered 
removed.383 The Court concluded that the presumptive period during which an 
alien’s detention is reasonably necessary to effectuate removal is six months, and 
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that there is “no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable 
future.”384 
Finally, in Clark v. Martinez, the Court held there is no reason why the 
period of time reasonably necessary to effect removal would be longer for an 
inadmissible alien, and therefore, the six-month presumptive detention prescribed 
in Zadvydas should be applicable to inadmissible aliens.385 Such an analysis 
illustrates how detainee law overlaps with the immigration experience. If courts 
applied the rationale of Zadvydas and Clark to Guantanamo detainees’ habeas 
cases, due process of law would be afforded and undue deference to the 
government could be avoided. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
As we learned from the experiences of Japanese Americans forced to live in 
internment camps during World War II, civil liberties should always be 
protected, even during wartime. We gleaned from the Guantanamo Bay detainee 
litigation in the D.C. Circuit that detainees face an incredibly high hurdle to clear, 
and the likelihood of their habeas petition being granted is slim or none. 386 In 
these habeas proceedings, the government only has to show that a detainee has 
done anything indicating an association with terrorists.387 After this minimal 
standard of proof threshold is met, the detainee will remain in custody in 
Guantanamo until hostilities against the U.S. end, which could be never. In the 
end, as much as a writ of habeas corpus was an inadequate remedy for Mitsuye 
Endo and Japanese Americans during World War II, it remains an inadequate 
remedy for Guantanamo detainees, and for Americans indefinitely detained under 
the NDAA. 
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